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Unreasonable Revelations:  God Told Me to Kill 
 
Linda Ross Meyer* 
 
 
In 1997, Christopher Turgeon, prophet of the Gatekeepers, 
and his co-congregant, Blaine Applin, heard the voice of God 
telling them to kill Dan Jess, a former member of their religious 
group.1  Together, Chris and Blaine drove from California to 
Dan’s house in Washington, praying for a sign that they were 
doing the right thing; they saw seven rainbows.2  When Dan 
answered his door, Blaine shot and killed him.3  Afterwards, 
Chris and Blaine felt a sense of peace and assurance that they 
had done the right thing.4 
Did God really speak? Should Chris and Blaine be guilty of 
murder?  What does the law do when its “reason” is called into 
question by a religious revelation that claims authority and 
moral certainty superior to and contrary to law?  We seem to be 
living in a time when this question is a common one.  The 
authority of the law, rule of law, and legal institutions depend 
on the existence of a shared common sense of reasonable people, 
reasonable argument, rational basis, reasonable doubt, and 
reasonable interpretation – i.e., a unifying nomos of reason. 
However, in the wake of religious violence, in the assertion of 
rights to legal exceptions on religious grounds, and in a 
religiously grounded backlash against science, the press, and 
university education,5 we are experiencing revelation’s 
 
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. I would like to thank 
Steve Gilles, Neal Feigenson, Stan Krauss, Kevin Barry, Jeffrey Cooper, 
Austin Voss, Caroline Meckel, Ian Ayres, Trisha Olson, Paul Lombardo, Russ 
Covey, Bill Edmundson, Neil Kinkopf, Jeff Meyer, and many other colleagues 
at Quinnipiac and at Georgia State Law School, who gave me excellent 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Despite their assistance, it is not 
divinely inspired (as far as I know). 
1.  State v. Applin, 67 P.3d 1152, 1153 (Wash. 2003). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Though not framed that way, the antipathy to educational institutions 
appears to be an inter-religion dispute rather than religion-versus-”secular 
1
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challenge to reason and law anew, though not for the first time.  
The shared normative ground that the law depends upon is at 
stake. 
This Article focuses on one extreme example of the law’s 
response to unreasonable revelations that is starkly presented 
in a series of unsettling murders:  those involving criminal 
defendants who claim they committed their crime because God 
told them to do it—known as “deific decree” cases.6  This example 
of the conflict between revelation and reason tests the limits of 
law’s ability to understand and countenance revelation when the 
stakes are highest.  The deific decree cases also present the 
hardest epistemological problems, because the defendant claims 
that the experience of God’s command is self-authenticating—a 
position fundamentally at odds with both scientific and legal 
standards of proof. 
Hearing commands from God in this context is 
characterized by almost all courts and commentators as a sign 
of mental illness.  Yet nearly a third of Americans believe that 
God speaks directly to them in personal revelation or prayer, 
some seeing an image and/or hearing an actual voice and words, 
others experiencing a “thought-insertion” from “outside” 
themselves.7  Moreover, the facts of these cases are similar to 
stories or examples from the western cultural record in which 
we rarely dismiss the God-hearing protagonists as insane.  To 
mention only a few: Jesus, Abraham, Joshua, Moses, Joan of 
Arc, John Brown, and various historical Popes are usually not 
presumed to be insane, but rather sane, honest, and, for the 
 
humanist.”  A Pew Trust study found that college-educated and non-college 
educated people attend religious services at roughly the same rate.  Chapter 2: 
Religious Practices and Experiences, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/chapter-2-religious-practices-and-
experiences/#private-devotions.  The difference comes in the practices and 
doctrines of the services they attend.  As before and during the Civil War, 
churches are divided, too, separating into red and blue branches, each accusing 
the other of heresy. EDWIN GAUSTAD & LEIGH SCHMIDT, THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY 
OF AMERICA:  THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN STORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
TODAY 191 (2002). 
6.  Applin, 67 P.3d. at 1153–54. 
7.  Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey: Religious Beliefs and Practices, June 1, 2008, at 53; TANYA MARIE 
LUHRMANN, WHEN GOD TALKS BACK: UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN 
EVANGELICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD 50–51, 211–15, 250–52 (2012). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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faithful, true recipients of God’s commands.  Many of these 
revered figures have even committed homicides purportedly at 
God’s behest. 
This classic criminal law problem of deific decree murder is 
in many ways parallel to claims of religious free exercise8 rights 
in cases where a defendant refuses to follow laws and social 
customs for religious reasons.  In this area, we usually 
acknowledge that the law is unable to distinguish the true 
revelation from the false and is limited to distinguishing the 
sincere believer from the insincere.9  In many areas where 
religion is set up as a defense to lesser crimes or legal 
obligations, the law may blink by using discretionary doctrines 
to avoid a direct conflict between law and revelation, or by 
allowing some free exercise exceptions for religious practices 
that cause little harm.10  Accommodation becomes more difficult 
when the stakes are higher, as when law’s own norms of equal 
treatment are challenged.  In murder cases, the conflict becomes 
acute:  we cannot avoid or soften the conflict between reason and 
revelation, and the sincere believer is a serious threat.  Though 
the state could certainly assert a “compelling interest” in 
refusing to accommodate a homicide,11 if the state were actually 
persuaded that the homicide was divinely ordered, its 
compelling interest in preventing it would be open to question.  
Presuming the believer insane is the law’s dodge here—but it is 
one  that  would  not  be  acceptable  in  most  free  exercise  cases 
 
 
8.  See Rabia Belt, When God Demands Blood: Unusual Minds and the 
Troubled Juridical Ties of Religion, Madness, and Culpability, 69 UNIV. MIAMI 
L. REV. 755, 773–76 (2015) (pointing out that courts take a subjective approach 
to the definition of religion in free exercise cases). 
9.  See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)(adopting a broad 
understanding of religion in the context of the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act and emphasizing the importance of adjudicating the sincerity and 
good faith of conscientious objectors, rather than trying to specify the outer 
limits of “religious training and belief”). 
10.  See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (restricted by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 
to require only the federal government to accommodate religious practices 
unless it has a compelling interest and narrowly tailored rule); Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, codified at § 2000cc-1 (stating 
that substantial burdens on religious practices of institutionalized persons 
must be justified by a compelling interest and regulations narrowly tailored). 
11.  Id. 
3
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because of its implication that a sincere belief in revelation is 
insane. 
Most cases and commentators do not take deific decree 
claims seriously as true revelation, but instead helpfully and 
carefully parse deific decree murders as various kinds of 
insanity claims.12  This Article argues that this is the wrong 
frame in which to consider these cases.  The doctrinal conclusion 
supported here instead is that assessing someone’s claim of 
“revelation” as insane or not is not within the jurisdiction of law 
and, therefore, a claim of deific command, absent other evidence 
of insanity, cannot be grounds for exculpation either as an 
excuse or as a justification, though the circumstances may be 
grounds for mercy or mitigation.  However, the more important 
insight is that the chaotic nature of the divine cannot be 
contained within law, whether the law is the law of a church or 
of a state.13  Rather, the divine exists beyond the bounds of both 
church and state law. 
This conclusion also entails that the legal status of the deific 
decree defense should have no relevance to the Establishment 
Clause, for establishing a church requires law, and law of any 
kind resists revelation (a deep irony implicit in any established 
religious tradition).  Moreover, seen from the prism of the deific 
decree doctrine, much of the rhetoric about how much religion 
we should or should not have in the public square is not about 
God at all: it is a dispute between legal traditions about which 
 
12.  For commentary, see Christopher Hawthorne, “Deific Decree”: The 
Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755 (2000); see 
also Belt, supra note 8 (highlighting the problem with the distinction between 
genuine revelation and madness, drawing on Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun, 
infra).  However, Belt’s primary concern involves expanding insanity 
exculpations, as she concludes that a deific decree exception “unacceptably 
privileges certain mentally ill criminal defendants whose delusions fit within 
an outdated model.” Id.; Andrew J. Demko, Note,  Abraham’s Deific Defense: 
Problems with Insanity, Faith, and Knowing Right from Wrong, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1961 (2005) (struggling more directly with the revelation issue); 
Stephen Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF L. REV. 123 (2018) (likening 
traditional insanity doctrine, including deific decree, to a loss of a sense of 
agency); Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or 
Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001) (taking the “genuine revelation” 
problem more seriously, but focusing primarily on the parallel problem in 
psychiatry).  For cases, see infra note 18. 
13.  See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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laws should govern us.  Neither legal nor religious institutions 
can claim an ineffable higher ground; both fall back on appeals 
to authority, tradition, text, and reason.  It should not come as a 
surprise, then, that God escapes law completely, whether it is 
the law of a church or of a state.14  Instead, the question that 
deific decree cases pose is how much protection should law give 
the insight, conscience, and experience of the divinely-addressed 
individual.  Considered in this light, the deific decree defense 
cannot be legalized, as the law cannot pronounce on the 
existence of the divine, nor discern revelation from rebellion.  
Revelation is beyond law, and those in its thrall can appeal only 
to mercy (understood here as law’s self-recognition of the limits 
of law). 
 
Introduction: The Traditional Insanity 
Frame and the Deific Decree “Exception” 
 
The classic and most widely-accepted M’Naghten test of 
insanity requires that, before a defendant may be acquitted as 
insane, he must show that he was “labouring under such a defect 
of reason . . . as not to know the nature and quality of the act. . . 
; or . . . that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”15  
The defendant who knows his act is wrong,16 but does it anyway 
because God told him to do it, presents this stark conflict 
between human law, reason, or custom’s claim to define wrong, 
and divine revelation to the contrary.  Nor does the traditional 
insanity doctrine allow room to argue divine compulsion: 
M’Naghten does not allow volitional defenses, but, in 
straightforward Kantian fashion, presumes that if you know the 
law and the facts, you are rational and thereby have the free will 
 
14.  “[Aslan is n]ot like a tame lion.”  C.S. LEWIS, THE LION, THE WITCH, 
AND THE WARDROBE 97 (Samizdat 2017) (1950) (emphasis in original). 
15.  R. v. M’Naghten, (1843) 10 CI. & F 200 (HL).  The factors are not 
dissimilar from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III(a): ignorance of one’s 
agency, the thing or person affected, the instrument that brought about the 
result, the effects of the act, and the quality of the act.  See ROBINSON, infra 
note 24 at 25. 
16.  Courts differ about whether it is only necessary that he know his act 
to be against the positive law or also that he know the act is against the social 
customs (nomos, reason) of his community.  See discussion infra pts. II(A), 
Conclusion. 
5
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to do the right thing.17  To know is to be free; to be free is to be 
able to act on your knowledge of right and wrong, regardless of 
what anyone else tells you—even God. 
There are quite a surprising number of murder and 
attempted murder cases involving claims that a defendant was 
acting against the law (and/or against social mores) because of a 
deific decree or divine command, and in all of the reported cases, 
these defendants purport to be following Christian practices, not 
those of other faiths.18  In some cases, these defendants ask to 
 
17.  M’Naghten,  10 CI. & F; see also note 336. 
18.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2010); Turgeon v. 
Garcia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21833 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2007); Guiteau’s Case, 
10 F. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Archie v. State, 875 So. 2d 336 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 
2003); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v. 
Malumphy, 461 P.2d 677 (Ariz. 1969); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 
1985); People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000), overruled by Price v. 
Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001); People v. Applin, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 
7416 (Cal. Oct. 31, 2001); People v. Duckett, 209 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Galimanis, 944 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); 
People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. Ct. App. Ct. 2009); People v. Wilhoite, 
592 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1987); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1968); State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 
448 (N.H. 1999); State v. Singleton,  48 A.3d 285 (N.J. 2012); State v. Worlock,  
569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962); People 
v. Schmidt, 101 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915); Galloway v. State, 698 P.2d 940 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1985); Olivier v. State, 850 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); State 
v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001); State v. Applin, 82 P.3d 243 (Wash. 2004); 
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 
(Wash. 1983); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983); State v. Turgeon, 
2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 1370 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004); State v. Potter, 
842 P.2d 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). There are also earlier cases that formed 
the basis of the novel, Weiland, discussed infra Section II(D), including ones 
involving John Yates, William Beadle, and Thomas Goss in 1785, and John 
Pastano in 1799 in New York. See infra Section II(D).  A case of “God told me 
to” (but where deific decree doctrine was not invoked) include a truck driver 
who killed two in a rear-ender claimed God told him to do it and also begged 
officers to kill him.  Associated Press, Suspect Says ‘God Told Me to Do it’ After 
Fatal Crash, FOX NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/01/27 
/suspect-says-god-told-me-to-do-it-after-fatal-crash.html.  Andrea Yates killed 
her children in order to send them to heaven, Psychiatrist: Yates thought she 
was defeating Satan, CNN (March 1, 2002), and Zacarias Moussaoui conspired 
with 9/11 terrorists as part of a religiously inspired jihad.  Richard Serrano, 
Life of a Terrorist: Seeking, and Finding, His Jihad, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2006), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-apr-24-na-moussaoui24-story 
.html.  I’m not aware of a case in which a lawyer was bold enough to assert a 
deific decree defense in an Islamic jihad case (a telling point for the claim made 
that the defense favors Christianity over other religions) but it is certainly 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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be acquitted under a special deific decree exception to 
M’Naghten or on the ground that the command of God skewed 
their understanding of moral wrong.19  In other cases, the 
defendants ask to be acquitted under a less well-accepted 
volitional test of insanity, such as the Model Penal Code’s 
“lacked substantial capacity” to conform to law, or Durham’s 
“product of mental disease”20 test, or an “irresistible impulse” to 
commit the crime.  Other cases resist the deific decree exception 
and insist that defendants who know the act to be illegal are 
guilty, regardless of whether they were commanded by a deity.21 
 
within the realm of doctrinal fit.  See Belt, supra note 8; Hawthorne, supra note 
12, Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347.  The International Criminal Court is struggling with 
a similar issue in the case of Dominic Ongwen, the kidnapped child-soldier who 
later directed and performed torture and genocide as a commander in Joseph 
Kony’s Lord’s Army.  Other members of the Lord’s Army have testified that 
Kony induced the belief in these young soldiers that he was possessed of spirits 
who would know even of disloyal thoughts.  The children were taught to believe 
that they, too, were possessed of spirits that spoke to them in dreams, allowed 
visions of the future, and rendered them bulletproof.  See Kristof Titeca, I 
Testified at the Trial of One of Joseph Kony’s Commanders. Here’s What the 
Court Didn’t Understand, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/17/i-
testified-at-the-icc-trial-of-one-of-joseph-konys-commanders-heres-what-the-
law-doesnt-seem-to-understand/?utm_term=.65647f9ad9af.  In August 2018, 
in a strange twist on these cases, James John Todd Kincannon in South 
Carolina killed his parents’ beagle-mix because God told him to.  Megan 
Cerullo, Former Republican Politician Said he Killed Parents Dog on 
Command from God, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2018, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ny-news-republican-politician-kills-
dog-20180804-story.html. 
19.  See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (“deific 
decree” exception); see also People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1191 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2009) (skewed understanding of moral wrong); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 
752 (Cal. 1985) (same). 
20.  People v. Rice, 757 P.2d 899, 904 (Wash. 1988) (insufficient evidence 
that will was “subsumed” by divine command to require deific decree 
instruction); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983) (free will 
“subsumed” by divine command).  However, the Appellate Court later stated 
in State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), that this is not a 
volitional test, but that the command skewed cognitive ability to understand 
wrong.  See also People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“Astros” 
command deprived defendant of “ability to conform” conduct, using MPC 
standard), abrogated by statute as described in Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 
354 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), 
abrogated by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
superseded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (reinstating M’Naghten in federal courts). 
21.  People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992) (Vollack, J., dissenting). 
7
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The deific decree cases are sometimes thought to be a legal 
anomaly, ginned into modern doctrine by Cardozo dicta and the 
Kadish Criminal Law casebook’s wide dissemination of State v. 
Crenshaw.22  But in fact, the uniqueness of the deific decree 
murder has a long and tangled history that is illuminating.  Part 
I of this Article works to untangle a bit of that history.  Part II 
provides a taxonomy of the problem, not historically or by 
doctrinal resolutions, but rather by how the cases and judges 
express the relationship between revelation and law.  There are 
many ways in which the law might, and has, responded to deific 
decree cases. This Article groups the materials into five types, 
related to the way in which the law reacts to claims of revelation: 
 
1. Revelation is treated as insanity; 
2. Only revelation that goes against the law is treated as 
insanity (or depravity); 
3. Revelation is treated as something that, if true, would 
supersede law; 
4. Revelation is treated as the only ground of truth; and 
5. Revelation is treated as beyond the jurisdiction of law. 
 
This Article will give both a legal example of each category 
and a philosophical analysis that ties the category to more 
general ideas about reason and revelation.  In doing so, the 
Article will also compare how a few established religious 
traditions handle the same problem.  The goal of this exercise is 
not solely to improve legal doctrine in deific decree cases, but to 
point out that both legal and religious institutions struggle with 
the problem of unreasonable revelations, and in much the same 
way.  What emerges from a close examination of the cases is that 
the conflict between law and revelation is not necessarily a 
conflict between (secular) law and (organized) religion, but 
between ethical communities and individual (divine?) insight.  
As such, the conflict here has roots in ancient debates about the 
nature of God, enthusiasm and evangelical movements 
throughout history, early American debates over styles of 
religious dialogue, natural law, and populism,23 as well as roots 
 
22.  Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488; see also Hawthorne, supra note 12. 
23.  CALEB SMITH, THE ORACLE AND THE CURSE: A POETICS OF JUSTICE FROM 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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in the ever-renewed conflict between the individual and the 
community. 
 
I.  Origins of the Deific Decree Doctrine 
 
Historian Daniel Robinson points out that the original form 
of an exculpatory insanity defense was entheos, or having a god 
within—which would make deific decree the prototype, not the 
outlier, of insanity defenses.  Throughout the Illiad, Homer’s 
characters, Helen and Achilles, exculpate themselves by 
claiming to be inhabited at times by divine entities: “The god 
might speak only to the chosen one, exciting wild and 
uncoordinated movements; or induce a frenzy as the sign of 
divine anger; or lead the victim to speak in tongues.”24  Later 
under Roman law, this entheos was  fanaticus or dementia—a 
divine madness that would come and go (as, perhaps, epilepsy 
does)—as opposed to furiosus or a more general and unremitting 
madness like that associated with rabies.25 
 
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 105 (Harv. Univ. Press 2013). 
24.  DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS AND IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 9 (1996).  Stephen Garvey has 
recently picked up on a variant of this ancient idea, arguing that much of 
insanity doctrine, including the facts in the M’Naghten case itself, should be 
understood as a loss of one’s sense of agency, not a loss of reason, Garvey, supra 
note 12, at 157 (explicitly pointing to the deific decree doctrine as an instance 
of his new theory as experiencing a sense of a loss of agency to God, though he 
would extend the doctrine to all command hallucinations); Id. at 168. 
25.  “Categories of mental competence were used to partition defendants 
in Roman law: non compos mentis, fanaticus, ideotus, furiosus.”  OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHIATRY 20 (K. W. M. Fulford et al. eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].  Justinian contrasts dementia and furiosus 
rather than fanaticus and furiosus.  See infra note 30.  See Dorothy May 
Paschall, The Vocabulary of Mental Aberration in Roman Comedy and 
Petronius, 15 LANGUAGE 4, 57 (1939) (“That the barbaric ceremonial of these 
[Cybele] cults made a great impression on the Romans however is shown by 
the word fanaticus which, meaning literally a ‘person attached to a temple,’ 
referred to the devotees of the Oriental religions par excellence. The 
metaphorical use of the word is rare, and limited to cases in which some notion 
of religious madness can be found. Cicero uses it twice, both times in 
connection with superstitio . . . . In Christian writings, fanaticus came to be 
merely a synonym of gentilis or ‘pagan’” (footnotes omitted)).  Voltaire’s much 
later rant about “fanaticus” may or may not illuminate its meaning so much as 
prefigure the “melancholy madness” attributed to religious enthusiasms in the 
eighteenth century.  See VOLTAIRE, 3 PHILOSOPH. DICTIONARY “Fanaticism” 
(1764) (stating “[w]e understand by fanaticism at present a religious madness, 
9
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In all these ancient texts, insanity was an excuse defense 
against criminal punishment, even if the affliction was 
intermittent, as long as the person was completely without 
understanding at the time of the criminal act.26  In Roman law, 
 
gloomy and cruel. It is a malady of the mind, which is taken in the same way 
as smallpox. . . . Fanaticism is, in reference to superstition, what delirium is to 
fever, or rage to anger. He who is involved in ecstasies and visions, who takes 
dreams for realities, and his own imaginations for prophecies, is a fanatical 
novice of great hope and promise, and will probably soon advance to the highest 
form, and kill man for the love of God”); see also John F. Sena, “Melancholic 
Madness and the Puritans,” 66 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV.  293 (1973) 
(“Melancholia” was attributed to Puritan out-groups). There is also mention of 
fanaticus in The Empyrean Canopy, an 1864 treatise on insanity, which 
diagnoses it as: “seeing visions wild and extravagant, in religious views, excess 
of enthusiasm, exhibiting strange motions and postures, vehement vociferation 
in worship, pretending to inspiration, or to have intercourse with superior 
beings, governed by imaginations rather than judgment and reasonable proof. 
Fanaticism is not so much a belief, as it is a strenuous and angry maintainance 
[sic] of a belief which has for its foundation no reasonable proof . . . . People in 
the church and out of it have been very zealous in using the epithet of insanity. 
Insanity is the plea, used now, in 1864, in church and out of it, for defamation. 
All of the above terms have been made use of by evil persons, to destroy the 
influence of truth, and defame character, used as an epithet to obliterate, rob, 
and destroy.”  WILLIAM M. PRIOR, THE EMPYREAN CANOPY 38–39 (1864). 
Another reference from 1864 is found in  Denny v. Denny, a suit for divorce in 
which the wife’s children sought to be appointed guardians ad litem and 
dismiss her suit.  90 Mass. 311, 312–14 (Mass. 1864) (“In Malin v. Malin . . . 
the chancellor says, ‘a person incompetent to protect himself, from age or 
weakness of mind, or from some religious delusion or fanaticism . . . ought to 
come under the protection of the court.’” (citations omitted)). 
26.  1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 59–60 (Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904) 
(The  Divine Marcus and Commodus issued a rescript to Scapula Tertullus in 
these words: “If you have clearly ascertained that AElius Priscus is in such a 
state of insanity [furor] that he is permanently out of his mind [continua mentis 
alienatione omni intellectu careat] and so entirely incapable of reasoning, and 
no suspicion is left that he was simulating insanity [dementiae] when he killed 
his mother, you need not concern yourself with the question of how he should 
be punished, as his insanity [furor] itself is punishment enough.  At the same 
time he must be closely confined, and if you think it advisable, even kept in 
chains; this need not be done by way of punishment so much as for his own 
protection and the security of his neighbours.  If however, as is very often the 
case, he has intervals of sounder mind, you must carefully investigate the 
question whether he may not have committed the crime on one of these 
occasions, and so have no claim to mercy on the ground of mental infirmity; 
and, if you should find that anything of his kind is the fact you must refer the 
case to us, so that we may consider, supposing he committed the act at a 
moment when he could be held to know what he was doing, whether he ought 
not to be visited with punishment corresponding to the enormity of his crime.  
But when we learn by a letter from you that his position in respect of place and 
treatment is such that he is in the hands of his friends, even if confined to his 
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insanity was compared to infancy, for a child who lacked basic 
understanding of right and wrong could not be convicted, as well 
as to idiotus, or a person who did not have sufficient 
understanding of fact to be responsible.27  Thus, as in 
contemporary formulations, including M’Naghten, knowledge of 
both law and fact was prerequisite to punishment.  Intermittent 
forms of insanity that resembled spiritual possession, or demens, 
like epilepsy, were not completely legally disabling: not only 
could one be guilty of a crime if one were momentarily lucid, but 
one could also competently engage in other legal transactions, 
like wills or contracts.28  The Latin dementia, used for this kind 
of temporary insanity, was later translated in English sources 
as lunacy (on the theory that its changes were affected by the 
moon).29 
 
own house, your proper course will be, in our opinion, to summon the persons 
who had the charge of him at the time and ascertain how they came to be so 
remiss, and then pronounce upon the case of each separately, according as you 
see anything to excuse or aggravate his negligence.  The object of providing 
keepers for lunatics [dementia] is to keep them not merely from doing harm to 
themselves, but from bringing destruction upon others; and if this last-
mentioned mischief should come to pass, it may well be set down to the 
negligence of any who were not sufficiently assiduous in the discharge of their 
office.” Id. 
27.  OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 25. 
28.  5 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 277 (“The Emperor Justinian to Julian, 
Praetorian Prefect[: ]”It sometimes happens that the affliction of insane men 
remains continuous, and with others the attacks of disease are suspended, and 
lucid intervals occur, and in this latter instance a great difference exists, for 
some of the lucid intervals are short, and others are of long duration. In former 
times the question arose whether the authority of the curator continued to 
exist during the lucid intervals of insanity, when it temporarily ceased, and 
when the disease returned, it was restored. Hence We, desiring to decide this 
doubtful point, do hereby decree that, as when insane persons of this kind 
recover their senses it is uncertain and impossible to determine whether this 
will endure for a long or for a short period, and as the parties in question 
frequently remain on the border line of insanity and health, and after they 
continue for a considerable time in this condition, the lunacy seems in some 
cases to be removed, We decree that the appointment of the curator shall not 
be considered as ended, but to exist as long as the insane person lives, for 
generally a disease of this kind is incurable; and We also decree that, during 
their perfectly lucid intervals, the curator shall not exercise his authority, and 
that the demented person, while he is temporarily in possession of his senses, 
can enter upon an estate and do everything else which sane men are competent 
to do”). 
29.  GEORGE WHITLEY ABRAHAM, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LUNACY IN 
IRELAND: TOGETHER WITH A COMPENDIUM 31 (1886) (stating “[t]he idea of a 
periodic insanity recurring at the changes of the moon, or in some way 
11
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English law kept this distinction between temporary 
possession (demens or lunacy) and permanent debility (furiosus) 
as well as its legal implications, though early decisions are often 
laconic and leave these matters to the King’s mercy.30  Through 
1300, judges referred the insane to the King’s mercy without 
further comment.31  In John Brydall’s 1700 treatise, he traces 
 
influenced by them, was familiar to the ancients . . . and while the cases of such 
insanity brought under the observation of actual experience may not be so 
numerous or so typical as to mark them off into a well-defined class, there can 
be no question that insanity of at least a seemingly intermittent character is 
developed or quickened in individual patients at seasons corresponding with 
the changes of the moon”). While Roman law does not suggest a “command of 
God” defense, according to Katherine Watson, medieval canon law accepted 
three, rather than two, versions of insanity, including a volitional component: 
“[A]s a defect of knowledge (the individual did not know what he was doing); 
as an instant compulsion (the individual was compelled or forced by some 
inexplicable necessity); and as a defect of rational capacity (the individual was 
not capable of reason because of intellectual impairment). All three categories 
implied, to a greater or lesser extent, a lack of free will . . . [with] no capacity 
to sin. . .According to canon law ‘affliction should not be heaped upon the 
afflicted.’”  KATHERINE WATSON, FORENSIC MEDICINE IN WESTERN SOCIETY: A 
HISTORY 73–74 (Routledge 2010). 
30.  Apparently other scholars do not think this is so clear, see Crotty, 
infra note 33, but it looks as though Justinian uses the terms furiosus and 
demens pretty carefully to distinguish total (furor) from intermittent (demens) 
loss of understanding, and distinguishes both from infancy and intellectual 
disability.  The distinction certainly makes sense, given that the most common 
forms of mental illness at the time were likely to be dementia (in the modern 
sense) or rabidity, both of which would worsen and result in a total deprivation 
of mind, and epilepsy, which would come and go.  Certainly furiosus would be 
descriptive of symptoms of rabidity and demens of symptoms of epilepsy.  
However, dementia was also used later as a generic term, with furor and 
lunacy as more specific terms.  See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 26 (stating 
“[t]he classification adopted by Chief Justice Hale is not very dissimilar . . . .  
Using dementia as one of the equivalents of insanity . . .  he divides it into—1. 
Idiocy . . . 2. Dementia accidentalis vel adventitia, which is (i.) quoad hoc vel 
illud, or (ii.) total; and again, is (i.) permanent or fixed, when it is called 
phrenesis, or (ii.) interpolated, and by certain periods or vicissitudes, when it 
is called lunacy; and finally, is (i.) more dangerous and pernicious, commonly 
called furor, rabies, mania; or (ii.) less so, such as is deep delirium, stupor. 3. 
Dementia affectata, namely, drunkenness”). 
31.  See, e.g., 1 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 66–67 (Trinity 
Term 1212)  (stating “the king is to be consulted about an insane man who is 
in prison because in his madness he confesses himself a thief, while really he 
is not guilty”); id. at 119 (stating that “Richard of Brent, son of Adam Thurbern, 
accused of larceny, comes and defends all of it and puts himself upon the 
country. And the twelve jurors . . . say that they do not suspect him, save of a 
fowl which he took in his madness at a time when he was lunatic.”); FREDERIC 
WILLIAM MAITLAND ET AL., 5 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II: THE EYE OF KENT 
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the continuities from Justinian through Bracton, Fleta, and 
Coke, and divides insanity into intellectual disability from birth 
(idiotus), temporary forms of insanity (demens or lunacy—like 
epilepsy), and permanent forms of insanity developed later in 
life (furor—like rabies).32  Hale and Hawkins continued this line 
of thought, and Hale is likewise clear that insanity includes 
being unable to distinguish between right and wrong, whether 
permanently or temporarily.33 
In 1724, Justice Tracy consulted these authorities in the 
case of Edward Arnold, instructing the jury to acquit “if the 
 
1313–14, at lxii (1996) (stating that “insane murderers were dealt with pretty 
much as we deal with them now.  A jury, to take an actual instance, finds that 
one Geoffrey ‘tanquam demens et furiosus occidit predictum J. et non per 
feloniam,’ and so [is not hanged but] must remain in prison during the King’s 
pleasure.”); see also SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, 
2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 490, 503 (Liberty 
Fund, 1898) (stating that “[h]omicide by felony is frequently contrasted with 
homicide by misadventure, homicide by self-defence and homicide committed 
by one who is of unsound mind.”).  Abraham also contains a helpful discussion 
of the terms as they were used in English law texts, with similar distinctions 
between demens and furiosus.  ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 23–38. 
32.  JOHN BRYDALL, “NON COMPOS MENTIS, OR, THE LAW RELATING TO 
NATURAL FOOLS, MAD-FOLKS, AND LUNATIC PERSONS INQUISITED AND EXPLAINED 
FOR COMMON BENEFIT 6–7 (1700) (defining fool natural as “one that is wholly 
deprived of his Reason and Understanding from his Birth,” also called by the 
law an Idiot, so that he: “cannot number to Twenty; nor can tell what Age he 
is of, nor knoweth who is his Father or Mother, nor is able to answer to any 
such easie [sic] Question; whereby it may plainly appear that he hath not 
reason to discern what is to his profit or damage, though it be notorious, nor is 
apt to be informed or instructed by any other”).  Brydall also defines madness 
as a permanent condition of insanity, as today might be suffered in Alzheimer’s 
or rabies, in which “one, that was of good and sound Memory, and by the 
Visitation of God, through some Sickness, Grief, or other Accident, utterly 
loseth his Memory, and Understanding; and so falls into some high, or low 
degree of Fury or Madness.”  Id. at 52  (referring to this category as furor men, 
signaling a continuity with Roman law’s furiosus).  Finally, Brydall defines 
lunatick as “one, that hath sometime his Understanding, and sometime not”).  
Id. at 94.  He connects this category with the falling-sickness,—i.e., epilepsy—
and notes that “[t]he Roman Lawyers do distinguish every where, betwixt him 
that is Furiosus, and him who is Demens.”  Id. at 95.  Furiosus is one who has 
lost all understanding, but Demens is “not continually.”  Id. 
33.  Homer D. Crotty, History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English 
Criminal Law, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 105 (1924); Anthony Platt & Bernard L. 
Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility 
and its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54 
CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966) (emphasizing the connection between moral 
maturity and right/wrong insanity tests). 
13
ARTICLE 6_MEYER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:37 PM 
758 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
defendant was under the visitation of God,34 and could not 
distinguish between good and evil, and did not know what he 
did.”35  Arnold was tried for the non-fatal shooting of Lord 
Onslow, a defender of the Protestant religion, because he 
believed Onslow was sending imps and voices to worry and 
tempt him, as well as deprive him of rest.36  Arnold was 
convicted, but pardoned through Onslow’s intercession.37  
Justice Tracy is often credited with articulating the wild beast 
test of insanity—that only someone who acts like a wild beast 
may be acquitted.  It is quite clear that this interpretation is 
inaccurate—Tracy was merely referring to a line in Bracton and 
earlier, in Justinian, which talks about the furiosus as having as 
little understanding as a brutus or animal.38  Reading the jury 
 
34.  Blackstone also used “visitation of God” language in his discussion of 
arraignments.  At common law, a defendant who would not plead either guilty 
or not guilty was subject to the torture of pressing—peine forte et dure.  
However, Blackstone noted that an exception was made for those who could 
not speak to enter their plea because they were under a “visitation of God” 
rather than “mute of malice.”  For those who could not speak a plea (either 
because of mental or physical disability), a jury was empaneled to determine 
whether their muteness was real or feigned.  If feigned, they were convicted; if 
real, they were tried as though they pled not guilty.  The term “visitation by 
God,” which appears in Blackstone and in Brydall, may appear to suggest that 
insanity was considered a kind of deific possession akin to deific decree 
situations.  See 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 323 
(1753) (stating “if [prisoner to be arraigned] says nothing, the court ought ex 
officio to empanel a jury to inquire whether he stands obstinately mute, or 
whether he be dumb ex visitation Dei. If the latter appears to be the case, the 
judges of the court (who are to be of counsel for the prisoner, and to see that he 
hath law and justice) shall proceed to the trial, and examine all points as if he 
had pleaded not guilty”); see also id. at 23 (stating “idiots and lunatics are not 
chargeable for their own acts”).  This “visitation of God” language became a 
kind of legal formula.  “By Visitation of God” [ex Visitation Dei] was also a 
formulaic phrase used extensively in coroner’s reports as the cause of death 
when the cause of death was not accident or was unclear, embarrassing, or 
could not be determined, well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
though the phrase was disapproved by medical societies in the mid-1800s.  See 
SARA M. BUTLER, FORENSIC MEDICINE AND DEATH INVESTIGATION IN MEDIEVAL 
ENGLAND 221–23 (Routledge 2016). 
35.  16 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST 
PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 695 (T.B. Howell ed. 1816) [hereinafter A 
COMPLETE COLLECTION]; see also ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 129–35. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  See BRYDALL, supra note 32, at 78–80. 
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charge as a whole, it is clear that Tracy is just repeating the 
ancient distinction between furiosus and demens and 
incorporating the requirement that the defendant be mature and 
aware enough to distinguish right from wrong.39 
From this brief history, one might conclude that the 
categories of prophet, visionary, and insanity overlapped 
completely, and thus the purported prophet was likewise 
exonerated—any deific decree defense was just another branch 
of the demens possession and/or temporary insanity defense.  
Where Roman law prevailed, there was little discussion of deific 
decree experiences as revelation rather than insanity.40  But 
insofar as a Christian spiritual cosmology infused the law, the 
question of possessed by whom complicated the story.41  While 
Tracy characterized Arnold as suffering from “a visitation of 
God,” the demens could also be considered “demon-possessed,” 
and insanity was often considered to be the result of sin.42  When 
medieval and early modern jurists now quoted the famous 
language in Justinian that furor was its own punishment,43 they 
 
39.  See Platt & Diamond, supra note 33; see also Anthony M. Platt, The 
Origins and Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its 
Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 1 
(1965) (arguing convincingly that the M’Naghten test was no innovation but 
was consistent with prior law and practice, whereas the “wild beast” test 
resulted from distorted understandings of key texts). 
40.  HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 421, 430 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1983) (both the 
Assizes of Ariano, circa 1115, and the Liber Augustalis, circa 1231, had 
exemptions from criminal liability for insanity. 
41.  H.C. ERIK MIDELFORT, A HISTORY OF MADNESS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY 
GERMANY 190 (1999) (pointing out that canon law modified Roman law by 
explicitly recognizing a volitional insanity defense when a defendant “was 
impelled or forced by some inexplicable necessity,” consonant with the 
Church’s emphasis on intentionality in defining sin, as well as with its 
acknowledgment of the possibility of demonic possession). A nineteenth-
century English experiment with a similar “irresistible impulse” volitional test 
was short-lived.  Crotty, supra note 33, at 119. 
42.  ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 61–66, 71–84, 117–21 (tracing the rise 
and fall of ideas of “possession” in medieval and early modern insanity law as 
Roman legal ideas encountered Christian cosmology); see also MIDELFORT, 
supra note 41, at 182–84 (recounting the 1590 trial of Conrad Herman, who 
killed his wife because he believed her to be a witch, in which the jurists 
applied the Roman law of insanity, but “were also troubled by the likelihood 
(as it seemed to them) that [the defendant] was only pretending to be mad and 
had actually given in to the suggestions of the evil spirit”). 
43.  See supra note 30, translated as “his insanity itself is punishment 
15
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heard in it the connotations of Matthew in which Jesus casts out 
demons, and Hosea 9:7 (King James): “the days of visitation are 
come, the days of recompence are come: Israel shall know it: the 
prophet is a fool, the spiritual man is mad, for the multitude of 
thine iniquity, and the great hatred.”44  Insanity itself was its 
own punishment, i.e., a divine punishment for sin. 
The concern for both Church and nascent State was not 
whether demonic possession was a real phenomenon (for well 
into the eighteenth century, if not beyond, the reality of demonic 
possession was never in doubt), but rather whether the demens 
was a charlatan (in which case confession and punishment for 
heresy or deception was required), suffering from a visitation of 
God (in which case care, compassion, and awe were the proper 
response), suffering a possession by demons (in which case 
exorcism was required), or had welcomed demons in through sin 
and was therefore a witch, heretic, or sorcerer (requiring 
confession and death).45  Categories were so contested that in the 
 
enough.”  More than one thousand years later, Blackstone quotes the phrase 
in his own discussion of insanity in English law: “‘[F]uriosus furore solum 
punitur’ [‘madness alone punishes a madman’]. In criminal cases therefore 
idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when 
under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.”  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, ch. 2 (2014) (ebook).  Note how the 
phrase subtly changes in meaning from, “no need to punish someone so 
afflicted,” to “insanity is punishment.”  
44.  Anthony Ossa-Richardon, Possession or Insanity? Two Views from the 
Victorian Lunatic Asylum, 74 J. HIST. IDEAS 553 (2013); Alexandra Walsham, 
Frantick Hacket’: Prophecy, Sorcery, Insanity, and the Elizabethan Puritan 
Movement, 41 HIST. J. 27, 59 (1998). 
45.  NANCY CACIOLA, DISCERNING SPIRITS: DIVINE AND DEMONIC 
POSSESSION IN THE MIDDLE AGES intro. (2003) (stating “[o]n the one hand, a 
person encompassed by constant supernatural interventions might be defined 
as a divinely inspired prophet or visionary, a mouthpiece of God.  Yet it was 
equally possible to categorize such an individual as a demoniac possessed of 
unclean spirits, as a false saint puffed up with pride, or as a victim of demonic 
delusion”); MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 184–86 (describing case of a 
“desperate Saxon mother” who took the lives of several of her children to 
prevent them from starvation, though she had plenty of food. The legal faculty 
at Wittenberg concluded she was not insane, but suffering from melancholy, 
which was both a disease caused by “black bile” and a sin of despair. Her 
mitigated punishment included exhortations from the gospel which “brought a 
spirit of joy that could drive out the sad suggestions of the evil spirit.”); id. at 
219 (quoting Paulo Zacchia, papal physician in 1621, “those are properly called 
demoniacs who are driven into insanity from a melancholy weakness, which 
the demons then use as if it were an instrument to possess them”); WATSON, 
supra note 29 at 73 (stating “[r]eligious beliefs made the issue of insanity and 
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1400s, Margery Kempe, a visionary English evangelist, was 
tried for heresy several times and wrote that she was often 
suspected of demonic possession, in part because of her ability to 
quote scripture verbatim.46  Debates over supernatural 
visitation raged through the centuries and cut across Catholic 
and Protestant boundaries, with each side often accusing the 
other alternately of either superstition or atheism.  All sides in 
these religious disputes sought to develop clearer distinctions 
among insanity, possession, prophecy, and witchcraft: “Doctors 
provided medical diagnoses, demonologists held forth on the 
scope of demonic agency, and inquisitors probed the workings of 
 
diminished capacity more complicated than it had been in the ancient world, 
and placed a new and unique hardship on insane defendants: they were at risk 
of being thought to be demonically possessed. Although the insane could not be 
considered guilty of a crime if they had not knowingly committed the offense, 
any persons whose ravings led to a suspicion of demonic possession were 
subject to the strongest penalties. The insanity defence could not therefore be 
used in witchcraft trials before a growing understanding of melancholia and 
delusion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries began to offer alternative 
explanations for the phenomena associated with witches”); see also Renate 
Blumenfeld-Kosinski, The Strange Case of Ermine de Reims (c. 1347–1396): A 
Medieval Woman between Demons and Saints, 85 SPECULUM 321, 322 (2010) 
(In the 14th Century: “[d]emons, rather than being agents of evil that tested 
humans’ endurance and spiritual steadfastness or participants in some 
learned magical ritual, became increasingly associated with . . . witchcraft. . . 
. . At the same time, the idea of possession became . . . ‘a major hermeneutic 
challenge’: who was in charge of ‘assigning meanings’ to spiritual 
phenomena?”); Michael Heyd, The Reaction to Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth 
Century: Towards an Integrative Approach, 53 J. MOD. HIST. 258 (1981); 
Andrew Keitt, Religious Enthusiasm, the Spanish Inquisition, and the 
Disenchantment of the World, 65 J. HIST. IDEAS 230 (2004); Anthony Ossa-
Richardon, Possession or Insanity? Two Views from the Victorian Lunatic 
Asylum, 74 J. HIST. IDEAS 553 (2013) (describing the conflicted position of 
asylum chaplains in the nineteenth century, some of whom argued that there 
was no distinction between “lunatics and demoniacs” and that both “maniacs 
and lunatics” were “demoniacs”—note the linguistic continuity with Roman 
law here); Olga A. Tsapina, The Image of the Quaker and Critique of 
Enthusiasm in Early Modern Russia, 24 RUSSIAN HIST. 251, 252–56 (1997) 
(Quakers’ position that one could communicate directly with God was 
dangerous, destabilizing and heretical during Civil War, Interregnum, and 
Restoration in England); Alexandra Walsham, Frantick Hacket’: Prophecy, 
Sorcery, Insanity, and the Elizabethan Puritan Movement, 41 HIST. J. 27 (1998) 
[hereinafter Frantick Hacket]. 
46.  MARGERY KEMPE, THE BOOK OF MARGERY KEMPE in GENELLE GERTZ, 
HERESY TRIALS AND ENGLISH WOMEN WRITERS, 1400–1670, at 69, 199 n.95 
(Cambridge 2012) (stating “she must be either spiritually inspired or 
demonically possessed to hold such scriptural knowledge”). 
17
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God’s providential order.”47 
Any tidy distinctions were also complicated by the fact that 
particular types of mental illness were often attributed to 
satanic influence.  For example, melancholia, or depression, was 
thought to be caused by “black humors” manipulated by demonic 
forces.48 Hence, suicide—a mortal sin and capital crime—was 
described in English formulaic indictments as “not having the 
fear of God before [one’s] eyes but being moved and seduced by 
the instigation of the Devil.”49  Suicides were punished both in 
this world—by forfeiting all possessions to the Crown50—and in 
the next—by receiving no sacred burial and perhaps losing the 
opportunity to suffer their way out of Purgatory. 
Statutes against sorcery, heresy, and witchcraft crossed 
between temporal and church authority.  While originally 
ecclesiastical offenders, impenitent heretics were turned over to 
the civil authorities for punishment and execution.51  In 
 
47.  Keitt, supra note 45, at 235; Owen Williams, Exorcising Madness in 
Late Elizabethan England: The Seduction of Arthington and the Criminal 
Culpability of Demoniacs, 47 J. BRIT STUD. 30, 43 (2008) (citing RITUALE 
ROMANUM PAULI V. PONT. MAX, IUSSU EDITUM 249 (Venice 1663); STUART 
CLARK, THINKING WITH DEMONS: THE IDEA OF WITCHRAFT IN EARLY MODERN 
EUROPE (Oxford 1997)) (proposing that the Church was very concerned to 
distinguish between the insane and the possessed); id. (citing D.P. WALKER, 
UNCLEAN SPIRITS: POSSESSION AND EXORCISM IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE 
LATE SIXTEENTH AND EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (Univ. Pa. Press 2016) 
(1981)) (proposing that the devil targeted for possession those suffering from 
mental illnesses); id. at 43 (citing WALKER, supra, at 36) (supporting his view 
from Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Matthew 4 and 17 that “the devil 
habitually uses the morbid effects of the moon on the humours, especially black 
bile, in order to torment demoniacs”). 
48.  See MIDELFORT, supra note 41; Sena, supra note 25. 
49.  Indictment of Aaron Burr, FOUNDERS ONLINE, Oct. 23, 1804, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-26-02-0001-0281; see 
also Terence R. Murphy, “Woful Childe of Parents Rage”: Suicide of Children 
and Adolescents in Early Modern England, 1507–1710, 17 SIXTEENTH CENT. J. 
259, 264 (1986); Williams, supra note 47, at 44. 
50.  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31.  
51.  Id. at 570–82. Even in the time of Edward I, jurisdiction was 
somewhat unclear, with some authorities stating that inquiries about sorcery 
are within the sheriff’s jurisdiction, while others claim “it is for the 
ecclesiastical court to try such offenders” though the king “as a good marshal 
of Christianity” might proceed “as he pleases.”  The first statute against heresy 
was passed about 1406, and Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, and James I passed others 
against sorcery.  However, Pollack and Maitland argue that executions of 
heretics, sorcerers, and witches were rare until the Commonwealth, citing 
evidence that only 15 were executed from the time of Henry VIII until 1644, 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, civil and 
ecclesiastic jurisdictions clashed over how to understand the 
phenomenon of demonic possession and who had authority to 
treat (or exorcise) those possessed and punish those responsible 
for the possession.52 
To take one colorful example, in the 1590s, a man named 
William Hacket roved through London declaring himself to be 
“Jesus Christ, King of the Earth and Christendom” and calling 
for the deposition of Queen Elizabeth I and the death of her 
ministers.53 Hacket developed a large and embarrassing 
following—especially among disgruntled Puritans—such that he 
created political turmoil during a time of official, if tentative, 
détente among Catholics, Puritans, and the Church of England.54  
He was arrested and convicted for treason, hung, drawn, and 
quartered, despite the fact that he maintained his divine mission 
 
though in the 16 years of Puritan rule, there were 109 “condemned and hung.”  
Id. at 582 n.503 (citing Francis Hutchinson, An Historical Essay Concerning 
Witchcraft (1718)).  These numbers apparently do not include the hundreds of 
Protestants executed for heresy during the Marian period, nor the hundreds of 
Catholics executed as traitors (rather than heretics) under Tudor rule for 
adhering to the view that the Pope, not the English monarch, was head of the 
Church.  PETER MARSHALL, HERETICS AND BELIEVERS: A HISTORY OF THE 
ENGLISH REFORMATION (Yale Univ. Press, 2018). 
52.  Marcus Harmes, The Archbishop and the Lord Chief Justice: 
Dispossessions and the Clash of Jurisdictions in Jacobean England, 3 
PRETERNATURE: CRITICAL & HIST. STUDS. PRETERNATURAL 32 (2014) (discussing 
cases of witchcraft and demonic possession in which both civil and church 
authorities claimed, and fought over, jurisdiction to exorcise and to punish); 
see also Frantick Hacket, supra note 45, Williams, supra note 47, at 38 
(providing a provocative connection to 1) Cicero’s list of kinds of insanity —
”Furor, Dementia, Insania, Fatuitas, Stultitia, Lethargia, and Delirium,”— 
translated as “violent madness, less violent madness, inconstancy of mind, 
idiocy, simplicity, radical forgetfulness, and dotage” and 2) to Cosin’s response 
to the Hacket case by using Cicero’s distinctions to prove Hacket was not 
suffering from Furor or Dementia, but rather from Insania—a mere wandering 
mind).  Williams also says that Church of England representatives were 
skeptical of demonic possession and exorcism, as it was associated with both 
Catholic and Puritan fringe groups.  Id.  From 1400–1612, heresy trials in 
England also bounced between ecclesiastical and royal courts, and relapsed 
heretics could be executed by secular authorities (as Joan of Arc was).  Heresy 
itself, of course, depended upon which English monarch was in power, as 
Protestants and Catholics were alternately orthodox and heterodox.  GERTZ, 
supra note 46, at 7–12. 
53.  CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF 
ELIZABETH, 1591–1594, at 75–76 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed. 1867). 
54.  Frantick Hacket, supra note 45.  
19
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even unto the scaffold, in wandering diatribes against the 
Queen.55  Hacket’s compatriot, Arthington, escaped conviction 
for treason by publishing a tract arguing that Hacket had 
demonically possessed him.56  Hacket’s death, Arthington said, 
had released him from his possessed state.57  Historian Owen 
Williams explains the complications in the politics of Hacket and 
Arthington’s cases arose from overlapping jurisdictions of 
ecclesiastical and legal authorities, the reluctance of Church of 
England clergy to acknowledge either possession or exorcism 
(because of their association with religious fringe groups, both 
Puritan and Catholic), and their equal reluctance to relinquish 
any traditional ecclesiastical authority.  Later, English lawyers 
struggled mightily—and unconvincingly—to prove that Hacket 
was, in fact, sane and no injustice had been committed. 
The provenance of an alleged deific decree would have been 
acutely and centrally important even in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century adjudications.  God, the Devil, witchcraft, 
and mental illness were all at work—and difficult to distinguish.  
Yet distinguishing between them was of the utmost importance. 
 
II.  Revelation and Reason in U.S. Courts 
 
Today, of course, we believe that we think differently.  
Medicine and science now understand insanity as a form of 
disease, not a mode of spiritual communication or demonic 
possession; yet, the problem of separating religious conviction 
and prayer from disease has not disappeared.  Courts still have 
to decide what to do with defendants who disobey the law 
because God told them to, and psychiatrists still have to decide 








55.  Id. 
56.  Williams, supra note 47. 
57.  Id. 
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A. Hearing from God Is Always a Symptom of Insanity 
 
“Insanity is a belief not founded on evidence.”58 
 
At one end of the spectrum is a legal response that 
automatically counts all sincere claims of revelation as insanity.  
As law is committed to reason and evidence as its metaphysics 
of truth, this position is natural to law and often presumed by 
commentators.  As an example, consider the trial of Charles J. 
Guiteau for the assassination of James A. Garfield.59  Guiteau 
was convinced that he was divinely chosen to do great things, 
and he expected that a rapid rise to distinction would be a sign 
of his vocation.60  It soon became apparent that academic 
distinction was not the destined path, and Guiteau left college.61  
Deciding that his greatness would appear in religious life, he 
joined the Oneida colony where he first worshipped and, later, 
excoriated its founder, Noyes, and then wrote his own book on 
theology plagiarized from Noyes.62  When Guiteau was expelled 
from Oneida and was not recognized as a prophet, he turned to 
law and politics.63  He wrote a speech in favor of Garfield’s 
candidacy for president, presenting it to a few small audiences.64  
When Garfield unexpectedly won, Guiteau believed his true 
vocation had been revealed and that his speech was responsible 
 
58.  Guiteau v. United States, 10 F. 161, 171 (S.D.N.Y.  1882). 
59.  Id. 
60.  CANDICE MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS, 
MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT (2011) (emphasizing in detail the 
biographical parallels of Garfield and Guiteau: both were raised in poverty by 
single parents, both narrowly escaped death and thought of themselves as 
“saved” for a divine purpose; Guiteau expected fortune to favor him, but it 
never did and Garfield, by contrast, had exactly the propitious meteoric rise to 
fame that Guiteau vainly anticipated; both wrote of their divine mission and 
“great expectations” with self-confidence; both shared expectations of divine 
favor; Garfield had many qualities, including emotional intelligence, genuine 
compassion, integrity, and willingness to work hard, that Guiteau’s sheer 
narcissism lacked).  The biography encourages the reader to ask whether, if 
Guiteau’s vaunting ambitions had been rewarded with as much alacrity as 
Garfield’s, would he have been the same, desperate, bitter, selfish creature.  
Was only one of these men insane? 
61.  Id. at 48. 
62.  Id. at 50–53. 
63.  Id. at 57. 
64.  Id. at 57. 
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for Garfield’s victory.65  Guiteau came to D.C. to claim his 
reward, and he pestered Garfield’s cabinet members for 
ambassadorships.66  When that avenue of distinction failed, 
Guiteau finally became convinced that God was telling him to 
kill Garfield in order to save the Republican Party and the 
nation.67  On July 2, 1881, he shot Garfield twice from behind at 
the train station, and Garfield died eleven weeks later of 
infection.68  Guiteau claimed insanity, and he cursed and ranted 
during much of the trial.69  Judge Cox’s summing up and 
instruction to the jury struggled to articulate the proper legal 
analysis of insanity: 
 
There are cases in which a man’s mental faculties 
generally seem to be in full vigor, but on some one 
subject he seems to be deranged.  He is possessed, 
perhaps, with a belief which every one recognizes 
as absurd, which he has not reasoned himself into, 
and cannot be reasoned out of, which we call an 
insane delusion, or he has, in addition, some 
morbid propensity, seemingly in harsh discord 
with the rest of his intellectual and moral 
nature.70 
 
A belief, says Judge Cox, “not founded on evidence,” is 
insane.71  Judge Cox then strives to distinguish normal religious 
belief from delusion, but his jury charge makes it clear that even 
widely accepted cases of religious inspiration cannot be 
understood as “sanity” under the law’s definition of reason and 
truth: 
 
A great many Christians believe, not only that 
events generally are providentially ordered, but 
that they themselves receive special providential 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  MILLARD, supra note 60, at 94–96, 106–08. 
67.  Id. at 113–15. 
68.  Id. at 131–32, 228–29. 
69.  Id. at 239–42. 
70.  Guiteau, 10 F. at 166 (emphasis in original). 
71.  Id. at 171. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
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guidance and illumination in reference to both 
their inward thoughts and outward actions, and, 
in an undefined sense, are inspired to pursue a 
certain course of action; but this is a mere sane 
belief, whether well or ill founded.  On the other 
hand, if you were satisfied that a man sincerely, 
though insanely, believed that, like Saul of 
Tarsus, on his way to Damascus, he had been 
smitten to the earth, had seen a great light 
shining around him, had heard a voice from 
heaven, warning and commanding him, and that 
thenceforth, in reversal of his whole previous 
moral bent and mental convictions, he had acted 
upon this supposed revelation, you would have 
before you a case of imaginary inspiration 
amounting to an insane delusion.72 
 
While Judge Cox struggles to limit religious conviction to 
modest irrationalities, it is hard to avoid the conclusion in these 
passages that St. Paul would be considered, under this analysis, 
legally insane, as was Abraham, who “insist[ed] that the 
Almighty has appeared to him and commanded him to sacrifice 
his child.”73  Only religious beliefs that are susceptible to 
revision in light of reason are, on the logic of this view, 
undoubtedly sane. 
Cox’s instructions to the jury underscored reasons to doubt 
Guiteau’s claim of divine command, precisely because it was not 
completely irrational: “And so, in like manner, I say, a man 
m[a]y reason himself into a conviction of the expediency and 
patriotic character of political assassination, but to allow him to 
find shelter from punishment behind that belief, as an insane 
delusion, would be simply monstrous.”74  After weeks of trial, the 
jury convicted the defendant in less than an hour.75 
Guiteau’s trial demonstrates one approach to law and 
revelation: Irrational revelations are ipso facto insanity.  A 
similar, but subtler, approach is for law to retreat into a position 
 
72.  Id. at 177. 
73.  Id. at 172. 
74.  Id. at 175. 
75.  MILLARD, supra note 60, at 241. 
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of extreme positivism and moral relativism, eliding both 
religious and ethical beliefs as subjective and unprovable and, 
therefore, irrelevant to law.  While not explicitly calling religious 
belief insane, this position denies claims to truth of both religion 
and ethics and tries to maintain a clear separation between the 
objective and subjective realms. 
In People v. Serravo, for example, the Defendant claimed 
that he should be acquitted on grounds of insanity because, 
while he knew it was against the law to stab his wife in the back, 
God had told him to do it.76  The doctrinal issue on appeal was 
whether the M’Naghten test should define insanity as being 
unable to know the illegal from the legal, in which case Serravo 
was sane, rather than the wrong from the right, in which case 
he might be considered insane.77  The majority upheld the 
relevance of the right/wrong formulation, but Justice Vollack’s 
dissent argued that “[u]ntil a moral standard becomes law it is 
an unreliable test for insanity.”78  Only delusions that affect a 
person’s ability to understand “what society has fixed and 
established as law”79 should be relevant, Vollack argued.  The 
majority “creates an exception by incorporating a subjective 
standard—a person’s religious inclinations and beliefs—into 
[Colorado’s definition of insanity.]  In Colorado, neither the 
General Assembly nor this court has accepted subjective tests to 
determine criminal responsibility.”80  Vollack’s position, like 
Cox’s, demonstrates law’s difficulty in thinking of religious 
convictions as having any connection with truth.  At best, they 
are unfounded opinions; at worst, they are insane delusions.  
However, like other instances of subjectivity, for Vollack, 
religious convictions amount to legal insanity only in cases in 
which they obscure one’s knowledge of the law on the books. 
A third approach that also illustrates a kind of presumption 
of insanity for religion would deny that deific decree cases are 
different in kind from any other command delusion.  While these 
commentators often favor broadening the legal insanity defense, 
 
76.  823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 147 (quoting State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 
1979)). 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 148. 
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rather than narrowing it, and do not usually paint morality as 
fatally subjective, they see no difference between a command 
from God and a command from dog.81  Christopher Hawthorne, 
for example, argued that deific decree was a “pseudo-doctrine,” 
for if God’s commands were considered to be different than other 
commands, the law would be establishing religion, and if God’s 
commands were no different from others, then judges were 
either sneaking in a volitional element to the insanity defense 
despite legislative disapproval of “irresistible impulse” 
formulations, or they were at risk of establishing a cultural 
defense for all religious and ethical non-conformists, like the 
infamous Rodney Crenshaw, who killed his allegedly unfaithful 
wife because of his “Moscovite” beliefs.82  Rabia Belt’s analysis is 
similar, though she argues for broadening, rather than 
narrowing, the insanity defense and for recognizing that 
presuppositions about religion affect not only the law but 
psychiatry as well.83 
So, deific decree doctrine seems to exemplify law’s 
discomfort with revelation.  Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun 
make just this point: 
 
The deific decree doctrine assumes that when the 
defendant heard the voice of God commanding 
 
81.  See Hawthorne, supra note 12, at 1759 n.19–20 (comparing “Son of 
Sam” killer David Berkowitz, who heard commands in the barking of a 
neighbor’s dog). 
82.  Id. at 1771–75, 1800–09; see also State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 
(Wash. 1983). The “Moscovite religion” Crenshaw purports to follow in this 
case is unclear.  There is a controversial New-Calvinist religious group in 
Moscow, Idaho near the Washington state border known as “Muscovite” that 
has strong anti-feminist and anti-divorce rules and has been active since about 
1977.  There is no apparent evidence that Crenshaw was a member of that sect.  
However, the Church’s ideology would be somewhat consistent with his 
assertion at trial that adultery was a capital sin. See Doug Wilson, The Death 
Penalty as Our Only Hope, BLOG & MABLOG: THEOLOGY THAT BITES BACK (Sept. 
27, 2017), https://dougwils.com/books-and-culture/s7-engaging-the-culture/dea 
th-penalty-hope.html (arguing that the death penalty is in principle religiously 
justified for sodomy and sexual sins); see also Peter J. Jankowski et al., 
Religious Beliefs and Domestic Violence Myths, 10 PSYCHOL. RELIGION & 
SPIRITUALITY 386 (2018) (analyzing a study of 238 students from a Protestant 
evangelical seminary that found positive association between New-Calvinist 
beliefs and domestic violence acceptance). 
83.  Belt, supra note 8. 
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him or her to kill, the defendant was experiencing 
a delusion—that he or she was not experiencing a 
true religious revelation.  The critics of the deific 
decree doctrine also make the same assumption.  
But is that assumption warranted?84 
 
They warn that preferring atheism to theism may violate 
the Establishment Clause by treating religious convictions less 
favorably than non-religious convictions.85  So, if law treats 
alleged commands of God as ipso facto delusional, there is no 
way to avoid denigrating religion, whether the law acquits only 
those commanded by God, or acquits all those with command 
hallucinations. 
 
B. God Is Reason (God Is Irrelevant) 
 
Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be 
compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he 
is recognized as one.86 
 
One obvious way to address the conflict between law and 
revelation without presuming religion to be a form of insanity is 
to identify the two: God is reason(able). Aquinas, for example, 
sought to provide an understanding of God that would enable an 
articulation of natural law that would necessarily accord with 
divine law.87  William of Ockham, however, thought that placing 
rational limits on God’s power was impious, as well as over-
estimating human ability to know God through reason.88  This 
 
84.  Morris & Haroun, supra note 12, at 1019; see also Demko, supra note 
12. 
85.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
86.  IMMANUEL KANT, RETHINKING THE WESTERN TRADITION: GROUNDWORK 
FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 25 (Allen W. Wood, ed. & trans., Yale Univ. 
Press 2002) [hereinafter GROUNDWORK]. 
87.  See C. STEPHEN EVANS, FAITH BEYOND REASON: A KIERKEGAARDIAN 
ACCOUNT 60 (1998)(stating “[i]t cannot be overemphasised [sic] that the 
function of reason in Aquinas’ view is to confirm that a purported revelation 
really is from God”). 
88.  See William of Ockham (Occam, c. 1280—c. 1349), INTERNET ENCYC. 
PHILOSOPHY 7a, https://www.iep.utm.edu/ockham/ (“God does not conform to 
an independently existing standard of goodness; rather, God himself is the 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6
ARTICLE 6_MEYER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:38 PM 
2019 UNREASONABLE REVELATIONS 771 
kind of extreme humility can lead to either unbreachable conflict 
between reason and revelation89 or a kind of irrelevance of 
religion to legal affairs.  As Julie Cooper explains: 
 
While Augustinians insist that divine 
omnipotence entails human impotence, 
Ockhamists contend that God is so powerful, and 
so unfathomable, that humans are left no choice 
but to manage their own affairs, because God is 
unavailable for consultation.  (As Hobbes develops 
this line of argument, submitting political life to 
divine direction betrays sinful pride, because it 
presumes that humans can know God.)90 
 
Kant’s Religion with the Limits of Reason Alone also takes 
on Aquinas’s task of unifying reason and revelation, but tries to 
accommodate the Ockhamist proviso that knowledge of God is 
beyond human capacity, while avoiding the real politik 
pessimism that seems to pervade Hobbes. From the doctrine of 
original sin, to salvation through grace, to the Trinity, Kant 
systematically reinterprets Christian doctrine philosophically, 
and Biblical narrative allegorically, to accord with his reason-
based ethical theory.  Important to Kant’s resolution of the 
conflicts is a kind of humility about religious truth.  For example, 
we need not assert that the Church is wrong about grace being 
necessary to salvation, we need only say that, if God is actually 
responsible for our good actions, we never know it and must 
assume nonetheless that striving to be good is within our power: 
 
Granted that some supernatural cooperation may 
be necessary to his becoming good, or to his 
becoming better, yet, whether this cooperation 
consists merely in the abatement of hindrances or 
indeed in positive assistance, man must first 
make himself worthy to receive it, and must lay 
hold of this aid (which is no small matter)—that 
 
standard of goodness”). 
89.  See infra pt. II(C). 
90.  JULIE E. COOPER, SECULAR POWERS: HUMILITY IN MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 64 (2013). 
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is, he must adopt this positive increase of power 
into his maxim, for only thus can good be imputed 
to him and he be known as a good man . . . . For 
despite the fall, the injunction that we ought to 
become better men resounds unabatedly in our 
souls; hence this must be within our power, even 
though what we are able to do is in itself 
inadequate and though we thereby only render 
ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us 
inscrutable assistance.91 
 
However, Kant’s humility about revelation makes 
revelation irrelevant, as he acknowledges.92  For example: 
 
[I]n the end religion will gradually be freed from 
all empirical determining grounds . . . . The 
leading-string of holy tradition with its 
appendages of statutes and observances, which in 
its time did good service, becomes bit by bit 
dispensable, yea, finally, when man enters upon 
his adolescence, it becomes a fetter.93 
 
If God is reason, at least so far as we can know, then reason 
alone is all we really need.  If God is reason(able), from the point 
of view of the deific decree exception, the conflict between reason 
and revelation is eliminated, because God could never command 
anything that was not right.  Therefore, if one knows the 
difference between right and wrong according to reason, a 
command delusion is no excuse, for knowing the difference 
between right and wrong is the very ground of knowing God: 
“even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with 
our ideal of moral perfection before he is recognized as one.”94 
 
91.  KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 40–41 (Greene 
& Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1934) [hereinafter RELIGION]. 
92.  Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 23 (Richard Polt 
trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1997) (1889) (stating “[t]he true world—unattainable?  
In any case, unattained. And if it is unattained, it is also unknown. And hence 
it is not consoling, redeeming or obligating either; to what could something 
unknown obligate us?”). 
93.  RELIGION, supra note 91, at 121. 
94.  GROUNDWORK, supra note 86, at 25. 
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One sees the effort to eliminate the conflict between reason 
and revelation in both legal and religious materials.  For 
example, in Archie v. State, a “floridly psychotic” Teresa Archie 
shot her daughter because she thought her daughter was 
consorting with Satan (she was reading a Stephen King novel), 
and God told her to do so.95  Archie was convicted by a jury on 
standard M’Naghten instructions.96  The prosecutor emphasized 
the testimony of a psychiatrist which stated: 
 
She was in a great deal of anguish and 
internal anxiety and turmoil.  God was telling 
her in her delusion to kill her daughter, but God 
also has told her and all of us Thou Shalt Not 
Kill.  So, we are getting conflicting instructions 
here from God in Teresa’s mind.97 
 
Archie testified that she asked for forgiveness both before 
and after she shot her daughter, and also that she ran to the 
road shouting “I done your Will Lord.”98  The Prosecutor argued 
that Archie would not have asked for forgiveness if she did not 
know that she had done wrong.99  Essentially, because Archie 
knew right from wrong, and she knew that God was good, her 
jury found that she should have concluded that God would not 
have commanded her to kill her daughter.100  Her conviction was 
upheld on appeal, with the appellate judge stating that: 
 
[I]t would appear that the jury could have 
reasonably questioned whether Archie really 
believed that God had directed her to commit the 
act, given the logical assumption that she would 
not have needed forgiveness, because acting on a 
directive from God would not constitute a sin or a 
moral wrong.  The jury could have also reasonably 
questioned whether Archie had asked for 
 
95.  875 So. 2d 336, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). 
96.  Id. at 346. 
97.  Id. at 342 n.3 (quoting Dr. Dixon). 
98.  Id. at 346 (citation omitted). 
99.  See generally id. 
100.  Id. 
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forgiveness because she could have been 
uncertain as to her interpretation of God’s will.  
This is a particularly tragic and troubling case.  
The record indicates that Archie was 
unquestionably suffering from a severe mental 
illness when she killed her daughter . . . . 
However, the law in Alabama is clear.  Archie had 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she 
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality 
or wrongfulness of her acts.  Resolution of any 
conflicts in the evidence is, of course, for the 
jury.101 
 
Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun point out that the problem 
of distinguishing between religion and delusion does not 
disappear when one treats religious delusion as a medical 
issue.102  While the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) 
struggles to define religious delusions without presuming that 
idiosyncratic religious beliefs are insane, in practice 
psychiatrists are more likely to believe that a religious belief is 
delusional if the divinity is acting unconventionally.  In a study 
of how psychiatrists determined whether a religious belief was 
delusional: 
 
Three variations of each core vignette were 
written to reflect conventional, less conventional, 
and unconventional practices.  For example, in 
one core vignette that focused on the dimension of 
what is communicated, individuals heard the 
voice of God telling them to: (1) baptize their 
newborn child—a conventional religious practice, 
(2) prepare a worship service—a less conventional 
religious practice, or (3) sacrifice their child—an 
unconventional religious practice.  The vignettes 
were tested on sixty-seven mental health 
practitioners of varying professional backgrounds, 
 
101.  Archie, 875 So. 2d at 343–44. 
102.  Morris & Haroun, supra note 12. 
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experience, and religious affiliation.  The results 
were not surprising.  For every vignette tested, 
the conventional response was rated significantly 
more religiously authentic and significantly less 
pathological than the less conventional response.  
For every vignette tested, the less conventional 
response was rated significantly more religiously 
authentic and significantly less pathological than 
the unconventional response . . . . Clinicians seem 
to be applying a “Good God” theory to measure the 
authenticity of a religious belief.103 
 
Religious communities often make the same assumption, 
accepting personal revelation as genuine only when it stays 
within the limits of the ethical, but rejecting revelations as 
insane or insincere when they diverge from the identification of 
God with reason.  Luhrmann reports that, when she asked 
members of the evangelical Vineyard church about how they 
determined whether an inner voice came from God, they replied: 
 
[The first test was whether the thought sounded 
like your own.] The second test was whether it 
was the kind of thing that God would say or 
imply.  This was often articulated as making sure 
that what you thought God had said did not 
contradict God’s word in the Bible.  This caution 
was explicitly expressed in all the written 
material and nearly every casual conversation on 
the topic.  Dialogue with God, for instance, states 
clearly (and repeatedly) that “if the revelation 
violates either the letter of the Word or the spirit 
of the Word, it is to be rejected immediately.”  
God is a loving God; a revelation that tells you to 
hurt yourself or someone else, people said, came 
from something other than God.  “You need 
discernment,” the pastor said.  “There’s a letter 
written from Paul when he says, ‘Don’t put out 
the fires of the spirit but test everything, and 
 
103.  Id. at 1038–39. 
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hold on to what is good.’ We don’t expect that God 
would want someone to cut themselves, or tell 
them to jump off a bridge. That is not God.”  
Notice that this would not apply to Abraham and 
Isaac or the other points in the Hebrew Bible 
when God acts, as the biblical scholar Jack Miles 
puts it when writing about the Book of Job, like 
a fiend.  When people talked about making sure 
that what you heard did not contradict the Bible, 
they really meant that it should be in keeping 
with the understanding of God’s character as 
taught within this church:  unconditionally 
loving, eternally forgiving. The God at the 
Vineyard was not a fiend.104 
 
Not all religious traditions, nor all legal cases, however, 
identify reason and God, as the next section makes clear. 
 
C. God Trumps Reason 
 
Now divine Testimony or Revelation requires these 
following Credentials: 
1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed by not 
inconsistent with reason; for intelligent creatures can 
never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore 
we are sure the popish doctrine of transubstantiation is 
not a matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary 
to all our senses and our reason, even in their proper 
exercises. 
God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
himself, and agreeable to his own nature and divine 
perfections. Now many of these perfections are 
discoverable by the light of reason, and whatever is 
inconsistent with these perfections, cannot be a divine 
revelation. 
But let it be noted, that in matters of practice 
toward our fellow-creatures, God may command us to 
act in a manner contrary to what reason would direct 
 
104.  LUHRMANN, supra note 7, at 64–65 (footnote omitted). 
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antecedent to that command. So Abraham was 
commanded to offer up his son a sacrifice: the Israelites 
were ordered to borrow of the Egyptians without paying 
them, and to plunder and slay the inhabitants of 
Canaan: because God has a sovereign right to all things, 
and can with equity dispossess his creatures of life, and 
every thing which he has given them, and especially 
such sinful creatures as mankind; and he can appoint 
whom he pleases to be the instruments of this just 
dispossession or deprivation. So that these divine 
commands are not really inconsistent with right reason; 
for whatsoever is so, cannot be believed where that 
inconsistency appears.105 
 
The assumption that God will always do what humans 
imagine to be good and/or in accordance with positive law is 
neither a necessary feature of all belief systems nor of all 
religious narratives.  Presuming that religion will dovetail with 
law may, therefore, be yet another kind of Establishment Clause 
violation.  As I pointed out at the beginning, even in 
Christianity, the most mainstream of United States religions, 
there are many stories of God commanding death and 
destruction that we would certainly find unlawful, unethical, 
and unreasonable.106  Does God’s command trump law, even 
when it seems wrong? 
Arguably, the original deific decree doctrine assumed just 
that.  Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
undertook to explain the doctrine of insanity in a case involving 
a prisoner who had killed a prison warden whom the prisoner 
believed was going to kill him.107  Shaw explains in his jury 
charge that ‘partial insanity’ may operate in one of two modes: 
 
 
105.  ISAAC WATTS, LOGIC; OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON, IN THE ENQUIRY 
AFTER TRUTH; WITH A VARIETY OF RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR IN THE 
AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES 235 (1724) 
(emphasis added). 
106.  See Numbers 21:2-3; Deuteronomy 20:17; Joshua 6:17, 21 
(commanding the extermination of Jericho’s inhabitants and those of other 
Canaanite cities).  Job and Abraham/Isaac are other examples—though these 
have happier endings. 
107.  48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844). 
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Either the delusion is such that the person under 
its influence has a real and firm belief of some 
fact, not true in itself, but which, if it were true, 
would excuse his act: As where the belief is, that 
the party killed had an immediate design upon his 
life, and under that belief the insane man kills in 
supposed self defence.  A common instance is 
where he fully believes that the act he is doing is 
done by the immediate command of God, and he 
acts under the delusive but sincere belief that 
what he is doing is by the command of a superior 
power, which supersedes all human laws, and the 
laws of nature. [Or] 2. . . . [T]hat the known 
tendency of that diseased state of the mind is to 
break out into sudden paroxysms of violence . . . 
towards friend or foe indiscriminately . . . 
overborne memory and reason . . . not of a mind 
capable of choosing . . . result of uncontrollable 
impulse, and not of a person acted upon by 
motives, and governed by the will.108 
 
Shaw states that a command of God, if true, “supersedes all 
human laws, and the laws of nature” and, therefore, like a 
reasonable belief that one is being attacked, a deific decree “if it 
were true” would justify the crime.109  This account of insanity 
does not assume that hearing God is itself insanity, or that God 
would never order a criminal act.  Rather, like Ockham, Calvin, 
or the Isaac Watts quotation at the beginning of this section, 
Shaw asserts the possibility of a God who might demand 
murder.  Contrary to Kant, God determines good, not the other 
way around.110 
So, on this model, if the divine command were real, the 
slayer would be justified.  If the slayer is sincere but reasonably 
 
108.  Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
109.  Id. 
110.  Drawing on Aquinas and Ockham’s dispute, there is a vast literature 
in theology on the virtues of ascribing to a “divine command theory” of ethics, 
or a natural law theory of ethics.  See, e.g., Wes Morriston, What if God 
Commanded Something Terrible?: A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics, 
45 RELIGIOUS STUD. 249 (2009); Jean Porter, Divine Commands, Natural Law, 
and the Authority of God, 34 J. SOC’Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 3 (2014). 
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mistaken about the divine command, the slayer is excused.  
Presumably, if the slayer is sincere but mistaken and did not 
follow proper protocols for discernment (see below), the slayer’s 
sentence might be mitigated because of his good faith, but 
unreasonable, mistake of fact.  The question of insanity is barely 
relevant, except to demonstrate that his mistake was sincere 
and/or not a product of negligent discernment. 
Shaw’s account was most likely relying on the language of 
Hale,111 and on the acquittal of James Hadfield in England in 
1800.112  Hadfield had attacked his own child and then tried to 
kill George III because of his belief that heaven had commanded 
that he kill himself and his child in order to save the world.113  
Because suicide was against divine law, Hadfield attacked the 
king as a way to ensure his own death.  Hadfield had previously 
suffered from multiple gruesome head and neck injuries from his 
military service with the Duke of York—providing the jury with 
graphic and rare physical evidence of his mental illness.  
Robinson reports that: 
 
Hadfield fostered the conclusion that actions 
arising from morbid delusion should be judged 
according to what the law would require or permit 
were the contents of the delusion true.  If, indeed, 
James Hadfield had been commanded by God to 
rid the world of himself but not by taking his own 
life, and if he sought to obey this [command by 
seeking to have the King’s defenders kill him], no 





111.  Hale is also the source of Cardozo’s hypothetical about a woman 
killing her child.  See ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 120; 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29 (1800). 
112.  A COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 35, at 1281; see also ROBINSON, 
supra note 24, at 141–54. 
113.  A COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 35. 
114.  ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 141–54; see also Garvey, supra note 12, 
at 153 (arguing that this mode of analyzing insanity as delusion presents 
judges and juries with the impossible task of applying legal rules—like 
necessity or self-defense—to a crazy subjective world). 
35
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Shaw’s position in Rogers imagines the possibility of law 
and reason superseded by religious command.  If so, then the 
deific decree exception should apply even when there is no sign 
of insanity.  Of course, presuming that a deific decree would 
trump the positive law would seem to be yet another clear 
violation of the Establishment Clause, as it substitutes a 
religious command for state law.  Jurisdictions that have 
adopted the right/wrong M’Naghten test have faced this 
problem, though most reach for some way to avoid it, either by 
adding a volitional component or by moving toward the 
legal/illegal version of the instruction.115 
For example, in State v. Turgeon, the case described in the 
introduction, Christopher Turgeon and Blaine Applin were 
members of a Bible ministry called Gatekeepers.116  Turgeon 
seemed in every respect sane, and “claims that he is able to 
predict events and that he regularly receive[d] messages from 
God.”117  In 1996, Turgeon received a message that “it was time 
to declare war against the government” and the Gatekeepers 
began robbing and defrauding businesses that they perceived to 
be sinful, and exacting judgment on those who left their group.118  
According to Turgeon’s testimony, one of these former members, 
Dan Jess, threatened to expose Turgeon as a false prophet and 
stop his plan to kill abortion doctors, so God told Turgeon to kill 
Dan.119  Turgeon’s instruction was confirmed by Applin’s own 
conversations with God, so Turgeon and Applin drove from 
California to Washington to shoot Dan.120  They allegedly gave 
God a final chance to dissuade them, if He caused an unplanned 
stop on the way.121  Instead, Turgeon and Applin saw seven 
rainbows, which they interpreted as a confirmation of their 
mission.122  Applin, who believed he was God’s “chosen vessel,” 
shot Dan as he answered his door.123 
 
115.  See, e.g., People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); State v. 
Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983). 
116.  No. 49535-6-I, 2004 WL 555278 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004). 
117.  Id. at *1. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. at *1, *4. 
120.  Id. at *1. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1. 
123.  State v. Applin, 67 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2003). 
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Two reasons this case is so disturbing are that, first, divine 
revelation is the only sign of unusual cognition in this case (at 
least, as the facts are stated by the appellate court), and, second, 
the two murderers, per their testimony, seemed to be following 
traditional religious doctrines for evaluating their divine 
communications, known as doctrines of “discernment.”  
According to these doctrines, signs that you have discerned 
God’s will correctly include: being filled with hope and passion 
after being given an instruction (this is a sign of God’s approval); 
coincidence with revelations to others (this is a sign of God’s 
confirmation); asking God to close doors in order to make it clear 
if you are on the wrong path, but no obstacles appear; and feeling 
at peace with your actions.124  According to the testimony in this 
 
124.  For more detailed discussion, see infra pt. II(C)(1)(a).  Catholic, 
Protestant, and evangelical groups all give roughly similar advice.  See Mark 
Bentz, Ignatian Discernment of Spirits, https://12473.sites.ecatholic.com/docu 
ments/2017/1/Discernment%20of%20Spirits%20Talk.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 
2019); Daniel D. Meyer, Sailing by the Light: How Do I Know Which Way to 
Go? (1997) (on file with author) (advising that people look to: (1) scripture; (2) 
contemplation; (3) respected peers; and (4) providential circumstances).  But 
see LUHRMANN, supra note 7, at 64, 70, 143 (finding a lot of hesitation and 
disagreement, even among those who believe they communicate with God 
directly and regularly: “[A] revelation that tells you to hurt yourself or someone 
else, people said, came from something other than God.” “For all the practice, 
hearing God’s voice remains a complicated discrimination task for these 
congregants.” “‘I think the safest position to be in is that God doesn’t speak to 
people outside the Bible,’ he told me. ‘I mean people say, “God’s telling me to 
go shoot an abortion doctor.” It’s craziness. Maybe it’s a spiritual experience; 
maybe it’s a lot of caffeine’”).  See also Simon Dein & Christopher C.H. Cook, 
God Put a Thought Into My Mind: The Charismatic Christian Experience of 
Receiving Communications from God, 18 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION & 
CULTURE 97, 106–08 (2015) (noting that the mode of communication is also 
understood by most evangelicals to differ—God puts thoughts in one’s mind, 
which may be ignored (“in all instances, agency is maintained”), or at times 
communicates out loud but without inciting fear or compulsion, whereas 
schizophrenia involves hearing voices that issue commands; that in his study 
communications from God were usually thoughts concerned with present, 
mundane matters, provided reassurance, and people sought to confirm these 
communications through scripture, or through the interrupting or alien nature 
of the thought or feeling.  Vicar of an evangelical church in England taught 
these discernment practices: (1) congregant should consider whether the 
purported communication was consistent with God’s “revealed character and 
will” rather than from their own “minds and imaginations” or from “the 
enemy.” (“Divine communication will never contradict scripture.”) (2) prophecy 
is “necessarily incomplete” until Jesus returns, so it is “not always 
authoritative, and needs to be tested,” (3) congregants should discuss 
prophecies pertaining to “birth, marriage and death” with vicar before sharing 
37
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case, Turgeon and Applin did all of these things: they 
deliberated and checked their messages with each other; they 
prayed and contemplated; and they gave God a chance to stop 
them.125 
Under the deific decree doctrine as Shaw states it, Turgeon 
and Applin would be innocent, whether or not they were insane, 
as long as they non-negligently and sincerely thought they were 
following a deific decree that, if true, would exonerate them.  The 
jury, however, convicted them.126  The trial court’s instructions, 
which were challenged on appeal, had required the Defendants 
to show that their “free will” was destroyed by the deific decree—
importing a volitional test into the M’Naghten instruction.127  
The Appellate Court upheld the conviction, but it did so by 
manipulating its way to a determination that the trial court’s 
addition of the instructional requirement of no free will was not 
really a volitional transformation of the right/wrong doctrine, 
but could instead be understood as requiring only the 
destruction of “defendant’s free will to distinguish right from 
wrong.”128  Yet, if the usual M’Naghten instruction had been 
given—that Defendant should be acquitted if he did not know 
right from wrong—then the case presents the real consequences 
of accepting, as Shaw did, that a command of God could overturn 
the law.  Turgeon and Applin should be acquitted, if indeed God 
commanded them or if their belief that God did so was non-
negligent and in good faith, or their sentence should be 
mitigated if their belief was sincere but negligent.  The insanity 
 
them, so he could pray for confirmation, since “these are often wrong and could 
do considerable harm to those involved”); Rodney Stark, A Taxonomy of 
Religious Experience, 5 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 97 (1965) (discussing taxonomy 
of religious experiences ranging from confirmatory feelings of awe or reverence 
or conviction, responsive experiences of divine presence or attention, ecstatic 
experiences of the above along with states of bodily excitement, like shaking, 
to revelational experiences of visions and signs, which are the rarest); Rodeny 
Stark, A Theory of Revelations, 38 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 287 (1999) 
(suggesting revelatory experiences occur most often within (1) supportive 
cultural traditions, (2) mundane experiences can be interpreted as divine 
communication, (3) most revelational experiences confirm rather than upturn 
the existing religious culture, (4) validation of the revelation requires social 
support, and (5) revelation occurs most often during times of crisis). 
125.  Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278; Applin, 67 P.3d 1152. 
126.  Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1; Applin, 67 P.3d at 1153. 
127.  Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1; Applin, 67 P.3d at 1154. 
128.  Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1 (emphasis added). 
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doctrine is irrelevant. 
Take, for example, the 1999 New Hampshire case of Mr. 
Blair, who believed that God had commanded him to bring his 
wife and child to a certain motel room and kill them there.129  
Blair did not claim to be insane, rather the contrary; Blair 
argued that God had revealed he would be thrown into a lake of 
fire if he did not kill his wife and son.130  At trial, he testified: “in 
my opinion, I’m sane. I acted under the command of God. I do 
not suffer delusions or hallucinations . . . I was very rational . . . 
I understood what I did.”131  If Shaw’s position is taken to its 
logical conclusion, Blair should have been able to invoke deific 
decree exoneration without claiming insanity. 
Judge Cardozo had foreseen the concern that deific decree 
exonerations would shade off into a kind of cultural excuse132 or 
free-exercise defense,133 in the oft-cited case of People v. 
Schmidt.134  Schmidt was the first United States case to give the 
matter an extended discussion, albeit in dicta.  Schmidt had 
been arrested for the murder of Anna Aumuller, whose 
dismembered body was found in the Hudson River.135  At trial, 
Schmidt confessed to killing her, but claimed that he had 
murdered her because “he had heard the voice of God calling 
upon him to kill the woman as a sacrifice and atonement.”136  
Two physicians “accepting as true his statement that he was 
overpowered by this delusion, expressed the opinion that he was 
insane,” while others opined that his “delusion was feigned, and 
his insanity a sham.”137  The jury, agreeing with the latter, 
convicted him of first-degree murder.138 
 
129.  State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999). 
130.  Id. at 449. 
131.  Id. at 450. 
132.  For a discussion of the “cultural defense,” see SANFORD H. KADISH 
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 349–350 (10th 
ed. 2017). 
133.  See Hawthorne, supra note 12, at 1768 (stating “[t]he logical 
modernization of deific decree would then be to extend it to include cultural 
defenses of all types”). 
134.  216 N.Y. 324 (1915). 
135.  Id. at 327. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. at 325. 
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In a motion for a new trial, the Defendant confessed that his 
insanity plea was indeed a sham, and that Anna had died of an 
illegal abortion.139  Still, he argued, he was not guilty of her 
death, but only guilty of trying to dispose of her body to protect 
those who helped her procure that abortion.140  Additionally, the 
Defendant requested a new trial on the ground that the jury 
instructions regarding his insanity claim were faulty.141  New 
York, like most jurisdictions then and now, followed the 
M’Naghten test of insanity.142  Before a defendant could be 
acquitted, he must show that he was “laboring under such a 
defect of reason as: (1) not to know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing; or (2) not to know that the act was wrong.”143 
As in the Turgeon case, the defendant argued that wrong should 
be defined as “morally wrong,” not “contrary to the law of the 
state,” as the trial judge had instructed.144 
Cardozo opined in dicta on the insanity instruction issue, 
even though he acknowledged that the Defendant had waived 
his insanity defense on appeal by conceding it was a sham.145  
Cardozo agreed with the Defendant that, in common law, wrong 
was understood as “evil” or “moral wrong,” a deed “‘against the 
laws of God and nature.’”146  Cardozo clarified that putting the 
jury charge in terms of whether the Defendant knew the act was 
“contrary to the law of the land” was misleading, because 
ignorance of the law is no excuse.147  Instead, the question is 
“whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to 
know that he was doing an act that was wrong” and “that act 
was at the same time contrary to the law of the land.”148 Cardozo 
also noted that M’Naghten itself held that those who, “under the 
influence of insane delusion,” believe themselves to be 
“redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or 
of producing some public benefit,” though knowing they are 
 
139.  Id. at 342. 
140.  Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324. 
141.  Id. at 324. 
142.  Id. at 334–36. 
143.  Id. at 329. 
144.  Id. at 329–30. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Schmidt, 216 N.Y. at 333–34. 
147.  Id. at 333. 
148.  Id. 
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acting “contrary to law” are not excused, because, as Shaw 
pointed out, “a delusion that some supposed grievance or injury 
will be redressed, or some public benefit attained, has no such 
effect in obscuring moral distinctions as a delusion that God 
himself has issued a command. The one delusion is consistent 
with knowledge that the act is a moral wrong, the other is 
not.”149 Cardozo then quoted Chief Justice Shaw’s language in 
Commonwealth v. Rogers: “where he fully believes that the act 
he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he 
acts under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing 
is by the command of a superior power, which supersedes all 
human laws, and the laws of nature.”150 
However, crucially, unlike Shaw, Cardozo goes on to make 
clear that personal cultural or religious variations are not 
sufficient by themselves to exonerate: 
 
Obedience to the law is itself a moral duty.  If, 
however, there is an insane delusion that God has 
appeared to the defendant and ordained the 
commission of a crime, we think it cannot be said 
of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong.  
It is not enough, to relieve from criminal liability, 
that the prisoner is morally depraved . . . .  It is 
not enough that he has views of right and wrong 
at variance with those that find expression in the 
law. The variance must have its origin in some 
disease of the mind . . . .  The anarchist is not at 
liberty to break the law because he reasons that 
all government is wrong. The devotee of a 
religious cult that enjoins polygamy or human 
 
149.  Id. at 334–35. See, e.g., State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990) 
(holding no need for deific decree instruction where defendant merely held the 
“idiosyncratic” moral belief that it was right for him to kill his friend to retrieve 
his stolen wallet); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (noting that 
defendant claimed his Moscovite beliefs justified him in killing his wife, if he 
believed her unfaithful.  Court held that adherence to a religious code was not 
the same as a direct command from God and could not exonerate him).  But see 
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985) (noting defendant who thought God 
required him to kill his wife because his marriage vows said “till death do us 
part” was entitled to a right/wrong M’Naghten instruction). 
150.  Id. at 336 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 
(1844)). 
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sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from 
responsibility before the law . . . .  In such cases 
the belief, however false according to our own 
standards, is not the product of disease.151 
 
In other words, religious law does not “supersede all human 
laws.”152  But that begs the question of whether a personal 
appearance by God would do so.  Cardozo seems to assume that 
such a personal appearance would necessarily “have its origin in 
some disease of the mind.”153 
Cardozo thus distinguished direct divine command from 
idiosyncratic religious or moral beliefs, even if he ducked Shaw’s 
conclusion that a genuine deific decree would justify murder, by 
presuming that experiencing a direct divine command would be 
a delusion.  Other courts have followed Cardozo in setting to one 
side cases in which defendants proffer cultural differences or 
alternative religious doctrines as their justification for 
murder154—these cases are considered to be different from a true 
visitation by God; but why? 
The troubling case of State v. Singleton struggles to find an 
answer.155  In that case, the Defendant tried to bring his mental 
 
151.  Id. at 340 (emphasis added). 
152.  Rogers, 48 Mass. at 503. 
153.  Schmidt, 704 P.2d at 784 n.16.  The decision also does not settle 
what would count as a “disease of the mind.”  Id.  If revelations themselves are 
considered delusions, then there is no other evidence of mental illness.  If 
something more is required, as Russ Covey has demonstrated, the “product of 
disease” requirement of M’Naghten is not much clarified, since a momentary 
delusion or a personality disorder may be considered a mental disease.  Id.; 
Russell D. Covey, Temporary Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the 
Perfect Defense, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1597 (2011).  As a result, Covey suggests that 
insanity doctrine be understood as a safety valve of the law, allowing juries the 
scope to have compassion for those whose minds are unusual.  Covey, supra.  
While Covey’s view is enticing, it does not solve the labeling problem: for a 
religious killing to be exonerated through this form of jury “safety valve,” it 
would still have to be called insanity.  Id. at 1631–32. 
154.  See, e.g., Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1324 (defendant’s belief that “might 
makes right” was a general moral belief and not a divine command); Crenshaw, 
659 P.2d at 494 (Crenshaw’s “Moscovite” belief tenet that he had a duty to kill 
an unfaithful wife was “not the same as acting under a deific command,” and 
his awareness that not just the positive law of Washington State, but the 
general “social standard of moral wrong” prohibited his act defeated his 
insanity defense.). 
155.  48 A.3d 285 (N.J. 2012). 
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illness under control through group study of the Old Testament.  
He “became obsessed” with study and “came to believe that God 
communicate[d] with him, although he d[id] not claim to hear a 
distinct voice speaking or commanding him.  Rather, he 
receive[d] messages or communications from God while 
asleep.”156  He felt “a general obligation to kill sinners who did 
not comport themselves in accordance with his beliefs about 
God’s expectations, once he explained those expectations to 
them,” and told various members of his family several different 
times that he was being told to kill them for their sins.157  When 
his girlfriend pressured him to take a job and work for money, 
which he believed was the root of all evil, he became 
progressively enraged with her.158  He shot and stabbed her 
when she refused to give him her car keys so he could leave the 
scene.159  After his arrest, he was asked if anyone else was 
involved in her killing, and he answered: “No, the devil, god and 
the devil (inaudible) inside of me, outside of me, all over the 
place, all over the place.”160  The jury, given a M’Naghten style 
instruction, convicted Singleton, and on appeal Singleton argued 
that the jury should have received a separate deific decree 
instruction.161  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied the 
appeal.162 
Despite testimony by both family members and a 
psychiatrist that Singleton believed God was telling him directly 
to kill specific people, a majority of the Supreme Court 
characterized this case as one in which the Defendant “formed a 
general belief that he ought to kill sinners” rather than “was 
acting pursuant to a delusional command at the time of the 
killing” which “deprived defendant of his ability to appreciate 
society’s disapproval of his action.”163 
The majority opinion provoked both a concurrence arguing 
for the abolition of any “deific decree” instruction, and a 
 
156.  Id. at 163–64. 
157.  Id. at 163, 168. 
158.  Id. at 163. 
159.  Id. at 165. 
160.  Id. at 168. 
161.  Singleton, 48 A.3d at 171–82. 
162.  Id. at 187. 
163.  Id. at 184–86. 
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dissent.164  Justice Hoens, joined by Justice Albin in dissent, 
pointed out that the majority was unreasonable to expect a 
divine visitation to come only as “a booming voice from 
heaven . . . found only in the cinema.”165  Moreover, Hoens 
clarified the difference between “reliance on a moral code that is 
on its face rational but unacceptable to our legal system,” and 
deific decree doctrine: 
 
The reason that the deific command qualifies as a 
defense to murder is that it is the one corner of 
insanity in which legal and moral wrong do not 
coincide . . . . One who acts in accordance with a 
sincerely held belief that he has been directed by 
God to carry out a murder may well appreciate 
that the crime is legally wrong, but will 
nonetheless act on the directive because he 
equally believes that it is a moral imperative.166 
 
Both the majority and the dissent in Singleton, then, 
implicitly accept Shaw’s premise that a command of God to do a 
specific act, if true, would be right according to our society’s own 
understanding of right and wrong, even though counter to a 
general moral rule or law.167  The deific decree rule is 
importantly limited to a specific command to do an act, not the 
establishment of a new rule.168  Though the courts never explain 
why they make this distinction in relation to deific decree 
doctrine, the law elsewhere recognizes a justification for 
exceptional, singular, lesser-evil cases of necessity.  Perhaps 
these judges accept the view that the law is entitled to assume 
that God knows best in some unlooked-for case in which infinite 
knowledge only could determine that murder was the necessary 
lesser evil in some cosmic chain of events (e.g., killing Hitler as 
a child).  On the other hand, maybe they believe that the self-
authenticating nature of revelation can only be singular, as the 
event of command is singular.  Alternatively, it is possible that 
 
164.  Id. at 188–203 (Patterson, J., concurring) (Hoens, J., dissenting). 
165.  Id. at 200 (Hoens, J., dissenting). 
166.  Id. at 199 (Hoens, J., dissenting). 
167.  See generally Singleton, 48 A.3d 285. 
168.  Id. 
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these cases demonstrate retention of a religiously positivist 
understanding of moral truth—that the command of a god is the 
final ground and test of ethical truth, and that this command, 
grounded in the will of a supernatural being, is necessarily not 
a rule but a personal willing of ‘thou shalt.’169  “Why is this right? 
Because God said so.”170 
Acknowledging that it is possible for law and God to diverge, 
however, does not just create a problem in criminal insanity law, 
it creates a problem for religious law.  As religious traditions of 
discernment show, and as the brief tour of history above notes, 
revelation destabilizes all law—religious or secular.  The 
religious traditions that have been around longest have all 
developed ways of insulating themselves from revelation or 
sifting it carefully through a rule of recognition—indeed that is 
the only way to avoid schism and dissolution. 
 
1. Religious Traditions of Discernment 
 
Unlike many early Protestants, who maintained the 
possibility of divine revelation contra law,171 many other 
 
169.  Cf. Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990). 
170. See also divine command theories of ethics, supra note 106. 
171. See Frantick Hacket, supra note 45, at 46–47, 49, 50–52, 59–61 
(discussing the dispute among Protestant clergy like William Perkins in 1587 
over whether purportedly new prophets could be genuine. According to 
Walsham, Perkins discounted those “who upheld heretical doctrine or lived 
vicious lives” and who were “rash, unruly, and obstinate or ‘babling and 
talkative’ rather than ‘silent with wisedom,’” who “spoke strangely and 
opaquely, or whose utterances engendered not God’s glory but ‘foolish feare’ 
and ‘disquietnesse’ in the church and commonwealth.’”  Hacket, however, who 
became popular enough to warrant execution, was all of those things.  
Walsham points out that in sixteenth century England, prophecy, witchcraft, 
and insanity were equally likely to be diagnosed, with much disagreement 
about how to judge between them.  While “Calvinist theology clearly did more 
to inhibit than encourage the appearance of popular prophets,” Walsham 
argues, “this should not blind us to the fact that it created a climate in which 
the idea that rational people might communicate with God and glimpse the 
unseen could not be dismissed a priori as ridiculous.  As yet each particular 
case had to be seriously investigated and separately assessed—hence the 
profound uncertainty of the puritan leaders.”  Walsham argues that this 
uncertainty in general resulted in acceptance of visionaries who did not 
“threaten[] the integrity of the institutional church,” and denunciation as 
lunatics, charlatans, or demoniacs of visionaries who did.  Hacket, a 
promiscuous brawler and “illiterate puritan messiah in Cheapside” who 
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religions acknowledged the chaotic nature of revelation (i.e., that 
God is not always reasonable), but then worked out clear 
institutional ways to cabin wayward prophecy and visions. 
Mormon doctrine, while acknowledging ongoing personal 
divine revelation, invests the bishop and church leaders with the 
right to discern the true prophet from the false: 
 
[A]nd unto the bishop of the church, and unto such 
as God shall appoint and ordain to watch over the 
church and to be elders unto the church, are to 
have it given unto them to discern all those gifts 
lest there shall be any among you professing and 
yet be not of God.172 
 
Jewish doctrine also places firm controls on prophecy and 
miracle.  It holds that a prophet can only be recognized once all 
the Jewish people on Earth are gathered in the same land, for 
God would not speak except to all the people together.173  No 
 
threatened the Queen’s life was the perfect target of Anglican clerics who 
wished to discredit all Calvinist and Presbyterian dissenters as “violent 
incendiaries.”  The puritan leaders, on the other hand, characterized Hacket 
as insane. However, most of the time, it “was not evangelical Calvinists but 
their conformist counterparts who began that great cosmological shift towards 
a world in which miracles had ceased and divine providence no longer 
intervened unpredictably.” “One consequence of this gradual ‘disenchantment 
of the world’ was the repudiation of divine communication as part of legitimate 
piety and its secularization or ‘somatization’ as a medical syndrome . . . . By 
the 1750s, all manifestations of charismatic Protestantism were being 
stigmatized as species of madness.”  Calvinists, by contrast, even had a divine 
explanation for insanity: “it was only when the deity withdrew his protective 
presence from sinners that they were invaded by Satan and driven out of their 
wits,” and insanity was a kind of divine punishment for sin or faithlessness 
“inflicted by the devil acting as the Lord’s executioner”). 
172.  THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINES AND 
COVENANTS, § 46, ¶27, https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/46?lang 
=eng. 
173.  Ani Maamin 06, ORTHODOX UNION (Aug. 30, 2006), https://www.ou.or 
g/judaism-101/glossary/ani-maamin-6/; MAIMONIDES, FOUNDATIONS OF TORAH, 
ch. 8 (trans. Simon Glazer, 1924) (ebook) (“Moses our Master was not believed 
in by Israel because he delivered tokens, for whosoever bases his belief 
contingent upon tokens retains suspicion in his heart, for it is possible that the 
token was delivered by means of enchantment and witchcraft . . . . 
Consequently they to whom he was sent are the witnesses by whom the truth 
of his prophecy is established, wherefor he needed no other token to deliver to 
them, as they and he witnessed it together . . . . Therefore, if a prophet arose 
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Jewish prophets have officially existed since the death of Haggi, 
Zechariah, and Malachi around 300 BCE, before the diaspora.  
In Jewish tradition, individual revelation is fallible and suspect, 
and cannot bind or provide the foundations of a People’s faith.174 
Catholic traditions of canonization and miracle-discernment 
play a similar role, and the many examples this long tradition 
provides warrant a more extensive review of both the black 
letter Catholic law of discernment and some of the cases in which 
it was applied.  As becomes apparent, canon law and Catholic 
doctrine replay the same difficulties with deific decree analysis 
as the secular courts do above.  This parallel is revealing; it 
demonstrates that what is at stake here is not so much a concern 
with an establishment of religion, as with the proper extent of 
community control of individual conscience.  As so eloquently 
framed by the juris-genitive and juris-pathic distinction in 
Robert Cover’s famous article, Nomos and Narrative, while 
nomos, or faith, is juris-genitive and authority-creating, the 
institutionalization of that nomos always requires some juris-
pathic suppression of lawless revelation as heresy.175 
 
a. The Catholic Example: Rules for Discernment 
 
While even the early Church condemned false prophets,176 
Nancy Caciola pegs the beginning of the Catholic juridical 
process for evaluating miracles and apparitions to the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215 under Pope Innocent III: “Henceforth, 
no individual’s supernatural powers or visions could be accepted 
as divine in origin without rigorous investigation.”177  Further 
rules regarding miracles were developed through later centuries 
by Jean Gerson (1363-1429),178 Saint Ignatius of Loyola 
 
and performed great tokens and miracles, and thereby seeks to deny the 
prophecy of Moses our Master, we must not hearken unto him.”). 
174.  Id. 
175.  Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos 
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
176.  See, e.g., Deuteronomy 13:4 (warning of false prophets). 
177.  CACIOLA, supra note 45, at 14. 
178.  Caciola argues that the increasing anxiety of the church around the 
time of the Great Schism (1378-1417) resulted in assertion of greater control 
over heresy, to the detriment of laity and especially of spiritual women, and 
Gerson et al. placed more emphasis on non-corporeal, non-emotional, doctrinal 
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(1548),179 and Benedict XIV in his Canonization of Saints.180 
Gerson, writing in the period of Joan of Arc, puts forward a 
coin metaphor for judging the true revelation from the false.  In 
discerning the true from the false spiritual coin, we must look, 
he says, to “weight, flexibility, resistance, form, and color.”181  
Weight is determined by humility; the person who takes pride in 
being worthy of visions “merits being the sport of illusions.”182  
Flexibility is determined by discretion; immoderate or 
exaggerated fasting or weeping is a sign of vanity or mental 
illness, not spirituality.183  Resistance is determined by patience; 
those who immediately believe in a vision have not been 
sufficiently reflective.184  Form is determined by truth; a vision 
that is not in accordance with scripture and “good customs and 
the true faith,” or prophecies that do not come to pass, or a divine 
command “counter to good habits” “without the very clear 
intervention of an order or dispensation of God” is false.185  Color 
is determined by the experience of non-carnal love associated 
 
markers of true prophecy:  “[They singled out the laity and women as especially 
unlikely candidates for divine inspiration . . . [and] directly blamed the 
prophecies of laywomen (notably Brigit of Sweden and Catherine of Siena) for 
the outbreak of the schism itself. . . [which] set the stage for the elaboration of 
the witch stereotype by the succeeding generation of thinkers.” Id. at 16–17; 
see also GERTZ, supra note 46, at 7–12, 50 (reporting that “[a]t the Council of 
Constance in 1415, the chancellor of the University of Paris, Jean Gerson, 
cautioned any confessor of a holy woman (they were at the time considering 
Bridget of Sweden for sainthood) to ‘resist her, upbraid her harshly, scorn her’ 
for her pride rather than ‘praise’ her for exceptional living”).  Gerson later 
famously wrote in support of the authenticity of Jean D’Arc’s visions and 
mission in 1429. Daniel Hobbins, Jean Gerson’s Authentic Tract on Joan of Arc: 
Super Facto Puellae et Credulitate sibi Praestanda (14 May 1429), 67 
MEDIEVAL STUDS. 99 (2005) (arguing Gerson was the actual author of this 
work). 
179.  Rules for the Same Effect with Greater Discernment of Spirits, ST. 
IGNATIUS LOYOLA, http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/seil/seil79.htm (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2019). 
180.  Fernando Vidal, Miracles, Science and Testimony in Post-Tridentine 
Saint-Making, 20 SCI. CONTEXT 481 (2007). 
181.  W.P. BARRETT, THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D’ARC 518 (Coley Taylor & Ruth 
H. Kerr, trans., Gotham House, Inc. 1932) (providing excerpts in translation of 
Gerson’s treatise). 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 521. 
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with the vision.186 
Saint Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, wrote in 
1548 what has become the classic treatise on spiritual 
discernment, which gives guidance to oneself for sifting true 
revelation from other mental experiences.187  Loyola’s spiritual 
advice suggests that the divine voice will always move one away 
from sin and away from despair and toward publicity, while evil 
spirits will move one toward selfish pleasures, secret desires, 
and despair.188  These experiences of elation and depression 
come and go, and when one is experiencing the elation of divine 
consolation, one should recognize it as grace, not merit, and 
remain humble.189  When one is experiencing desolation, one 
should not make rash decisions, but be patient and keep to one’s 
good actions, trusting that consolation will return and holding 
to the memory of prior consolation.190  By extension, in 
evaluating the genuineness of others’ spiritual experience, 
looking to their actions and humility, rather than their emotive 
moments of elation or depression, is key to discernment.191 
Benedict XIV’s 1740 treatise reserves beatification and 
canonization for those confessors whose writings are neither 
contrary to sound doctrine nor good morals, who have a 
reputation for sanctity, whose lives exhibit heroic virtue, and 
who have been proven to do two to four miracles.192  Notably, the 
miraculous alone will not suffice, for its provenance is always 
equivocal.193  As Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote, a trance or 
“[a]bstraction can occur from three causes.  First, from a bodily 
 
186.  Id. 
187.  ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, RULES FOR THE SAME EFFECT WITH GREATER 
DISCERNMENT OF SPIRITS, http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/seil/seil79.htm (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Camillo Beccari, Beatification and Canonization, CATHOLIC ENCYC. 
www.newadvent.org/cathen/02364b.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
193.  See, e.g., CACIOLA, supra at 45, at 18 (an anonymous clerical 
commentator’s defense of Franciscan John of Rupescissa quoting “[h]e 
predicted many future events as if through a prophetic spirit, and many people 
doubted whether he was deceiving, or telling lies, or was speaking with a 
python or an evil spirit. However, this man lived a holy life, sober and honest, 
and was a cleric learned in scripture and in the texts of the sacred canon”). 
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cause, as is clear from those who through some infirmity are out 
of their minds.  Second, through the power of demons, as is seen 
in those who are possessed.  Third, from the divine power.  It is 
in this sense that we speak of ecstasy, when one is elevated to a 
supernatural level by the divine spirit, with abstraction from the 
senses.”194 
The Church’s skepticism about religious experience—
trances, visions, and emotional ecstasies—continues through 
the centuries.  In the modern period, after an outbreak of Marian 
visions,195 Pope Paul VI disseminated Norms Regarding the 
Manner of Proceeding in the Discernment of Presumed 
Apparitions or Revelations, made public only in 2012.196  This 
1978 document included both positive and negative criteria for 
determining the “authenticity and supernatural character” of an 
alleged miracle or prophecy.197  These include: (1) “[m]oral 
certitude, or at least great probability of the existence of the fact, 
acquired by means of a serious investigation;” (2) “[p]ersonal 
qualities” of those who witnessed the miracle, including 
“psychological equilibrium, honesty and rectitude of moral life, 
sincerity and habitual docility toward Ecclesiastical Authority, 
the capacity to return to a normal regimen of a life of faith;” and 
(3) “[h]ealthy devotion and abundant and constant spiritual fruit 
(for example, spirit of prayer, conversion, testimonies of charity, 
etc.).”198 
Negative criteria include: (1) “[m]anifest error concerning 
the fact;” (2) “[d]octrinal errors attributed to God himself, or to 
 
194.  Id. at 33 (citation omitted). 
195.  See Frederick M. Jelly, Discerning the Miraculous: Norms for 
Judging Apparitions and Private Revelations, 44 MARIAN STUDS. 41, 43 (1993) 
(making the point that miracles are, in Catholic tradition, far less important 
than charity and church doctrine, and that even among “mystical phenomena,” 
corporeal visions rank lower than imaginative (dreams) and intellectual ones 
(“a simple intuitive understanding of a supernatural mystery”).  Such visions 
“do not make any substantial addition to the deposit of faith and morals 
necessary for salvation,” id. at 44, compared to other “supernatural” gifts like 
“acts of faith, hope, love; the infused virtues given by God; prayer, worship, the 
spiritual and corporal works of mercy; transubstantiation,” id. at 44–45. 
196.  Norms Regarding the Manner of Proceeding in the Discernment of 
Presumed Apparitions or Revelations, SACRED CONGREGATION DOCTRINE FAITH, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cf
aith_doc_19780225_norme-apparizioni_en.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. 
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the Blessed Virgin Mary, or to some saint in their 
manifestations, taking into account however the possibility that 
the subject might have added, even unconsciously, purely 
human elements or some error of the natural order to an 
authentic supernatural revelation;” (3) “[e]vidence of a search for 
profit or gain strictly connected to the fact;” (4) “[g]ravely 
immoral acts committed by the subject or his or her followers 
when the fact occurred or in connection with it;” (5) 
“[p]sychological disorder or psychopathic tendencies in the 
subject, that with certainty influenced on the presumed 
supernatural fact, or psychosis, collective hysteria or other 
things of this kind.”199 
Decision on these factors was strictly confined to a 
hierarchical decision-making process resembling trial and 
appellate bodies (the bishop-commissioned Ordinary in the first 
instance, relying on expert theologians, canonists, psychologists, 
and doctors, with appeal of sorts to the Sacred Congregation, 
which retained original jurisdiction in serious cases). The bishop 
in charge can come to one of three conclusions: (1) the apparition 
is true and worthy of belief (but belief is not required), (2) it is 
not true, or (3) it is uncertain.  The Pope does not make 
pronouncements about the authenticity of apparitions: 
 
[t]o prevent confusing such a judgment with the 
exercise of his infallible teaching authority in 
matters of faith and morals (i.e., matters which 
must be believed and observed by all the faithful 
for the sake of salvation).  The charism of 
infallibility has not been given for the purpose of 
judging apparitions and private revelations.200 
 
While the Vatican seems to keep no official online lists of its 
cases of Saints or miracles, other investigators set the count of 
the beatified at 371, and the sanctified at 307, as of 2009.201  
 
199.  Id. 
200.  Jelly, supra note 195, at 46; Junno Arocho Esteves, How the Church 
Determines a True Marian Apparition, CRUX (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2017/04/19/church-determines-true-marian-appa 
rition/. 
201.  ROBERT J. BARRO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF SAINTHOOD (A PRELIMINARY 
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According to another online amateur scholar, twenty-two 
Marian apparitions have been investigated and received 
episcopal approval by the Catholic Church.  Nine have been 
approved since 1900.202 
 
b. The Catholic Example: Two Cases of Revelation 
 
i. Joan of Arc – 1431, 1455 
 
The two trials of Joan of Arc present paradigmatic cases: the 
first for heresy and, twenty years later, the second for 
rehabilitation. Joan’s story remains unaccountable.  A quiet, 
pious farm girl living an unremarkable life suddenly begins 
bossing around nobles, bishops, and kings, riding war horses, 
directing battles, second-guessing generals, and wielding 
lances.203  She convinces an arch-bishop and two sets of canon 
lawyers and prelates of her divine mission and sincere faith.204  
Her key prophecies—the raising of the siege of Orleans, the 
crowning of the Dauphin at Reims, the fall of Paris to the 
French, the end of English rule in France, and the return of the 
Duke of Orleans—all come to pass (though the last three only 
after her execution), despite the fact that when she makes these 
predictions, Henry VI is claiming both England and France, the 
key cities are under English control, and the penniless 
Dauphin’s own mother has denied his legitimacy.205  The record 
of Joan’s trial, transcribed by notaries in the pay of her enemies, 
shows her standing up to day after day of intense interrogation 
in a roomful of well-educated and subtle churchmen, without 
counsel, presumably without sleep (since she was celled with 
 
INVESTIGATION) (February 2010), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/barro/files/s 
aints_paper_020910.pdf.  
202.  MIRACLE HUNTER, http://www.miraclehunter.com/ (last visited Apr. 
17, 2019). Approval of miracles is more common, especially healings.  
According to the seven rules promulgated by Pope Benedict XIV, (1) the disease 
must be serious; (2) the diagnosis must be certified; (3) it must be organic; (4) 
no known therapy can explain the healing; (5) the healing must be instant and 
unexpected; (6) the healing must be complete; and (7) the healing must be 
definitive.  Vidal, supra note 180. 
203.  W.S. SCOTT, THE TRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC (1956). 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. 
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three English male guards), with patience, wisdom, and 
remarkable consistency. 
In her trial for heresy, the procurators probed Joan’s story 
for signs that the voices she claimed to be guided by were false 
or demonic.206  Their questions, often odd and unaccountable by 
contemporary lights, are clearly guided by an effort at 
discernment, as laid out by Gerson, above. 
Regarding pride: Did she think herself special for hearing 
her voices?  Did she believe herself to be in a state of grace?  Did 
she encourage others to worship her, or her relics?  Did she hope 
to gain treasure for herself?  Did she humbly consult with priests 
or clerics about her voices before acting?  Here, there were many 
probing questions about instances where women wanted to lay 
hands on her, her disposal of her personal effects, gifts made to 
her by the Dauphin, as well as whether she would submit to the 
Church’s determination as to the validity of her voices.207  Her 
answers left no impression of her wanting to be worshipped 
herself; rather, she claimed that her voices could be heard by all, 
if they merely listened.  While she refused to be bound by the 
determination of the partisan body trying her, she did agree to 
be judged by the Pope (a fact later suppressed by Bishop 
Cauchon).208 Her response to the trap set by the procurator’s 
 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. 
208.  Id. at  16–19, 126; RÉGINE PERNOUD, THE RETRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC: 
THE EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL FOR HER REHABILITATION 252–53 (J.M. Cohen 
trans. 1955).  The notary of the original trial, Guillame Manchon, was a key 
witness at the rehabilitation trial, and gave testimony that the final Latin 
version of the trial record, and of the accusations, contained a number of 
inaccuracies, and he presented his original French notes at the second trial.  
Id.  He also testified that the version of the official accusation that he had 
signed had contained his corrections, but the corrected version was never sent.  
Id.  The Orleans manuscript is considered by W.S. Scott to be a copy of 
Manchon’s original notes and differs in key respects from the remaining 
manuscript copies of the official Latin version. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 16–
19.  The other major evidentiary dispute is exactly what Joan eventually 
admitted to when faced with the threat of execution.  Several witnesses claim 
that the short abjuration read to her and signed by her was mostly about 
agreeing not to bear arms and to resume women’s dress, and there is some 
dispute about whether she ever rejected her voices. The abjuration document 
officially circulated after her execution was much longer and included many 
other more serious admissions of heresy and witchcraft. See PERNOUD, supra, 
at 258–61 (discussing this dispute).  The text read to her at her abjuration, and 
her later comments in her prison cell that demonstrated relapse, were not 
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question regarding being in a state of grace became famous for 
its wisdom: “if I am not, may God put me there; if I am, may He 
keep me there,” though the content of her answer was not 
original, but echoed a common prayer.209 
Regarding instability: Did she show emotional instability or 
mental illness?  Did she live a chaste and moderate life?  Did her 
jumping out of a tower at Tours demonstrate despair or suicidal 
impulses?  Here, in light of her obvious common sense and 
solemn Catholic responses, as well as her well-documented 
virginity (tested before she came to the Dauphin by a group of 
noblewomen210), the strained claims that she had practiced 
witchcraft or prostitution or was suicidal rang particularly 
hollow. 
Regarding patience: Did she immediately believe that these 
voices and visions came from God?  She was asked to describe 
her visions and voices in detail for signs that they were 
demonic.211 She claimed they came with the church bells and 
that she did not trust them at first, but came to believe their 
counsel was good,212 as they enjoined her to behave and to go to 
church often.  In other words, she herself tested these voices by 
the criteria of works. 
Regarding truth:  Did her predictions come true?  Here, it 
was pointed out that, at the time of her trial, many of these 
predictions, especially about battles to be won at Paris and the 
return of the Duke of Orleans, had not come to pass.  Did she 
have some spiritual “sign” that her revelations were legitimate?  
Much questioning concerned how she proved to the Dauphin 
that she had come from God.  She often refused to answer this 
question, as her sign, she said, was for him only, and that only 
 
contemporaneously recorded by any notary but reported by witnesses. Id.  
Scott’s source has her briefly rejecting the validity of her voices, but reaffirming 
them the next day (as she dons men’s dress), and blaming herself for doubting. 
SCOTT, supra note 203, at 169–70. If she was sexually assaulted while in a 
dress, as witnesses at her rehabilitation claimed she asserted, she may well 
have thought it her punishment for disobeying her voices. But the 
rehabilitation trial witnesses deny that she ever disavowed the divinity of her 
voices. PERNOUD, supra, at 206–07, 209–11, 215. 
209.  Katharine Lualdi, “Joan, Are You in a State of Grace?”: Joan of Arc 
and Late Medieval Catechesis, 32 J. WESTERN SOC’Y FRENCH HIST. 1, 8 (2004). 
210.  SCOTT, supra note 203, at 12. 
211.  Id. at 67, 73, 78–79, 80, 85–86, 88, 90, 105, 120–21, 146–47. 
212.  Id. at 120. 
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he could confirm it.213  After this question was repeated again 
and again, she gave the judges a kind of parable, saying that the 
sign was an angel offering a golden crown—a metaphoric 
description of herself.214  Later, Charles said that the real sign 
was that she knew the contents of the prayer he had privately 
offered a few days before, and that she had recognized him 
despite his hiding behind others when she first arrived.215 It is 
clear that Joan’s interrogators at both trials were looking for 
some divine sign that was intersubjective—seen or confirmed by 
someone other than her. 
Did her life accord with Scripture and good morals?  Much 
was made here of her failure to dress as a woman—an easily 
proved and obvious deviation from the customs and rules of the 
Church at the time.216  When she finally consented, however, to 
wear a dress in her cell, she was either denied other clothes, or 
she was sexually assaulted,217 and she reclaimed her soldier’s 
attire.218  This relapse in dress then became an easily provable 
legal basis on which to show that her submission to the Church 
was insincere and to justify the Church’s decision to abandon her 
to English secular justice—and to the stake (only relapsed 
heretics could be executed).219 
The final sermon preached to her demonstrates the 
irreconcilable conflict between the intersubjectivity of law and 
reason (even canon law), and the subjective, personal experience 
of revelation.  The core of Joan’s heresy, according to her 
accusers, was that she trusted her own uneducated judgment 
about the divinity of her voices.220  She rejected the Court’s 
judgment that her visions and voices were either false or 
demonic, and she refused to submit to the hierarchy of the 
 
213.  Id. at 69, 77, 80, 88, 101–02, 107. 
214.  Id. at 15. 
215.  Id. at 15–16. Her loyalty to Charles was also demonstrated at her 
public recantation, when she interrupted the harangue against her heresy only 
when it touched Charles, and she then protested that her king was a good 
Catholic.  PERNOUD, supra note 208. 
216.  SCOTT, supra note 203, at 134–35. 
217.  PERNOUD, supra note 208, at 209–10. 
218.  SCOTT, supra note 203, at 14. 
219.  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 571–83 (also known as 
“obstinate” or “obdurate” heresy). 
220.  SCOTT, supra note 203, at 160. 
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church: 
 
[I]f such apparitions [in the likeness of angels or 
saints] appear to you, do not believe them, but 
reject and cast out such follies and imaginations, 
in agreement with the statements and opinions of 
the University of Paris and the other doctors, who 
are conversant with and understand God’s law 
and the Holy Scriptures; to whom it seems that 
one should give no credence to such apparitions 
and other novelties, unless they are justified in 
Holy Scripture or by some other sign as being 
miraculous.  In these you have believed most 
lightly, without having recourse to God in devout 
prayer, in order that you might be made certain in 
the matter; nor have you had recourse to any 
prelate or other wise and learned churchman, who 
would have been able to inform you of the truth; 
which, considering your condition and the 
simplicity of your knowledge, you ought to have 
done.221 
 
Joan, then, was condemned and burned for her faith in her 
self-authenticating personal revelations and for her refusal to 
accept religious law in their stead. 
 
ii. The Rosary Messages – 1988 
 
In the modern period, Father Jelly explains how the 
Church’s 1978 criteria were applied by a visitation committee 
investigating a purported vision by a small congregation of 
charismatic Catholics in Lubbock Texas in 1988, known as the 
“Rosary Messages.”222  The events began when ten parishioners 
smelled roses and felt the presence of Mary while saying the 
 
221.  Id. 
222.  See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Lubbock Journal; Reports of Miracle Draw 
Throngs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/17/us/l 
ubbock-journal-reports-of-miracles-draw-throngs.html; Jelly, supra note 195, 
at 41. 
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rosary.223  Some of the congregants began to receive messages, 
experience healings, and see visions, and an increasing number 
of the faithful and curious (around 12,000) began to join them to 
experience wonders during the praying of the rosary, 
culminating in a vision of Jesus at sunset. 
When the episcopal committee examined these messages 
and healings, it concluded that, while they were generally 
“within the boundaries of sound Roman Catholic teaching and 
Christian tradition,” some messages “did betray an angry God in 
language that was strident and affected and caused us to 
question their claim to divine inspiration.”224  The committee 
concluded that “[the messages and healings] were not of 
miraculous origin but were inner locutions of the recipients, 
derived from their spiritual reading, the preaching they had 
heard, and from their own meditation or contemplative 
prayer.”225  As for those seeing visions, they “must be warned 
against the harmful effects of gazing at the sun, as well as 
against an other-worldly attitude suggesting that they abandon 
their sources of economic support.”226  The committee cautioned 
that “the piety engendered be not individualistic, but rather that 
it lead to real community and social concern.”227  Jelly concludes: 
 
We cannot build our faith on the sand of alleged 
apparitions and private revelations, regardless of 
how well-intentioned the individuals involved 
might be. If we believe that our salvation 
depends on what is found in private revelation, 
or if we place—with vain credulity or naivete—
our confidence in private revelations, we are 
mistaken and are not building our faith on a solid 
foundation, namely, the Word of God, Scripture, 




223.  Id. 
224.  Jelly, supra note 195, at 49. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. at 51. 
227.  Id. 
228.  Id. at 54. 
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Here, of course, is the crux of the problem: reason is 
accessible to all; revelation is individualistic.  As in the Jewish 
tradition, the Catholic tradition looks askance on private, 
personal access to God’s will that is not accessible to all the 
people at once. Like reason, and like law, revelation in these 
traditions is only acceptable if intersubjective, capable of testing, 
mediated by fair process, in accordance with established law and 
custom, and generally accessible and applicable to all equally. If 
it is not, then, under church law, it is not to be considered likely 
true revelation.  In this way, one might say that religions with a 
long history have a law of revelation that turns revelation into 
law, very like Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone.229  Personal experience of God’s will may be a helpful 
personal devotional crutch, but can never overturn ethical 
doctrine.  Any deific command that violates ethical duties cannot 
be legitimate. 
Some have argued that the established church’s role in 
disciplining heresy and revelation should enable a kind of 
jurisdictional federalism between church and state.  Steven 
Smith, for example, has argued that the First Amendment 
religion clauses could be read to protect only religious 
institutions, not personal conscience.  Thus, he argues, 
individual deviation from secular law, as opposed to a church 
law’s deviation from secular law, would be well-within the 
secular law’s jurisdiction.230  Though Smith does not address the 
deific decree cases, one might extend his argument about 
jurisdictional separation to claim that personal revelations 
unsupported by religious institutions should not be protected by 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment at all, and the deific 
decree excuse should be a non-starter, because even under 
church law, murder could never be justified.  Hence, deific 
decrees unblessed by church doctrine should not be a defense, 
not because secular law trumps religion, but because religious 
institutions have already ruled out such a defense as contrary to 
church doctrine.  While it may be tempting to recognize or 
resurrect a jurisdictional federalism of church and state law, 
 
229.  See generally RELIGION, supra note 91. 
230.  Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church, in 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 249 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). 
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Smith’s approach displaces the conflict between reason and 
revelation, but does not eliminate it.  Secular courts will still 
have to decide what counts as a church, an exercise fraught with 
establishment clause difficulties, especially because it is often 
the prophet that creates a church in the first place.  The problem 
of revelation’s radical undermining of law is not, therefore, a 
problem of church versus state, for revelation undermines all 
law, whether church law or state law.  As Jean of Arc’s accusers 
argued, there can be no self-authenticating prophet recognized 
from within the institution of a pre-existing church, for a self-
authenticating prophet creates a new church by that very act.  
As Benedict XIV’s treatise implies, no Catholic saint can be 
sanctified by miracle alone.  A deific decree defense that would 
rely on a pre-existing “church” for its authentication would chase 
its tail. 
 
2. Revelation and Genius 
 
Writing within a decade or so of Cardozo’s opinion in 
Schmidt, playwright George Bernard Shaw, contra Cardozo, 
sees the irrational revelation and unlikely prophet not as insane, 
or as particularly religious, but as centrally important to the 
individual conscience and entrepreneurial spirit.  In his play 
about Joan of Arc, Saint Joan, Shaw characterizes Joan of Arc 
as a proto-Protestant martyr who embodies the spirit of 
individualism.231  His paean to Joan might be read from this side 
of the Atlantic as a celebration of the anti-hierarchical and 
democratic nature of American political and spiritual life232—a 
celebration that echoes, perhaps, Emerson’s transcendentalism, 
presages the American evangelical movement, the American 
 
231.  GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN (1924). 
232.  Amanda Porterfield, A History of Ambivalence:  How Religion and 
U.S. Law Have Developed Together, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 21 (Austin 
Sarat, ed., 2012) (also suggesting that personal revelation has a peculiarly 
American character:  “religious expression has been channeled into grooves 
shaped by the law’s more predominant emphasis on protection of private 
property and individual rights. Religion in the United States has become more 
commercial and more individualistic relative to the law’s privileging of 
property and persons, and relative to the ambivalent relationship between 
property and persons that have characterized American law”). 
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fascination with superheroes and celebrities, and the individual 
specialism that has been both our bane and our blessing. 
Shaw writes: 
 
Joan’s voices and visions have played many 
tricks with her reputation.  They have been held 
to prove that she was mad, that she was a liar and 
impostor, that she was a sorceress (she was 
burned for this), and finally that she was a saint.  
They do not prove any of these things; but the 
variety of the conclusions reached shew how little 
our matter-of-fact historians know about other 
people’s minds, or even about their own.  There 
are people in the world whose imagination is so 
vivid that when they have an idea it comes to 
them as an audible voice, sometimes uttered by a 
visual figure.  Criminal lunatic asylums are 
occupied largely by murderers who have obeyed 
voices.  Thus a woman may hear voices telling her 
that she must cut her husband’s throat and 
strangle her child as they lie asleep; and she may 
feel obliged to do what she is told.  By a medico-
legal superstition it is held in our courts that 
criminals whose temptations present themselves 
under these illusions are not responsible for their 
actions, and must be treated as insane.  But the 
seers of visions and the hearers of revelations are 
not always criminals.  The inspirations and 
intuitions and unconsciously reasoned 
conclusions of genius sometimes assume similar 
illusions.  Socrates, Luther, Swedenborg, Blake 
saw visions and heard voices just as Saint Francis 
and Saint Joan did . . . . [T]here are forces at work 
which use individuals for purposes far 
transcending the purpose of keeping these 
individuals alive and prosperous and respectable 
and safe and happy in the middle station of 
life . . . .  Our Churches must admit that no official 
organization of mortal men . . . can keep pace with 
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the private judgment of persons of genius.233 
 
The destabilizing voice of the unlikely prophet, and the 
American embrace of both the “private judgment of persons of 
genius” and Protestant evangelical movements, from the time of 
Nathaniel Hawthorne to the California Gatekeepers, are at the 
heart of Cardozo’s concern that the deific decree cases not allow 
cultural or personal moral peculiarities to excuse murder.234  
However, George Bernard Shaw reminds us that madness is also 
divine inspiration, which has been understood as the most 
authentic and trustworthy expression of truth—a truth beyond 
the boundaries of common human law and everyday 
understanding—since at least Plato’s Phaedrus.235 
 
3. Revelation and Revolution 
 
Revelation has also been associated with revolution, when a 
claim of divine justice is made that requires violence.  The 
American parallel to Joan of Arc is Nat Turner.  Nat Turner led 
an insurrection in Virginia in August of 1831 in which twenty to 
forty enslaved African Americans killed fifty-five white people, 
most of them women and children, before they were scattered 
and captured by armed local militia members.236  The attacks set 
off a widespread panic throughout the white South, resulting in 
retaliatory murders and further restrictions on enslaved people. 
Thomas Gray, a white lawyer, interviewed Turner in prison 
to ask him why he did this.237  Turner calmly and clearly 
explained that he had a mission from God.238  The signs of his 
special mission included that: he was born with “certain 
marks”239 on his head that his parents interpreted as meaning 
 
233.  SHAW, supra note 231. 
234.  Id. 
235.  ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 24.  
236.  Scot A. French, The Confessions of Nat Turner (1831), ENCYC. VA., 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/_The_Confessions_of_Nat_Turner_1831 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
237.  Id. 
238.  THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER: WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS 
(Kenneth S. Greenburg, ed. 2017) [hereinafter CONFESSIONS]. 
239.  Id. at 42 (giving a helpful caution regarding reading this document—
Gray clearly interjects his voice at some points in Turner’s narrative, but the 
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he was “intended for some great purpose;” as a child he had 
knowledge of things that had happened before he was born; he 
was often told as a child that he “had too much sense to be raised, 
and, if I was, I would never be of any service to any one as a 
slave;”240 and he was precocious, learning to read without being 
taught, and curious about everything, especially science and 
religion.241  He became a natural leader at a young age, and he 
often read the Bible, prayed, and fasted, becoming known as a 
preacher and a healer.242  He began to have visions of “white 
spirits and black spirits engaged in battle” and of the “lights of 
the Saviour’s hands, stretched forth from east to west, even as 
they were extended on the cross on Calvary for the redemption 
of sinners.”243  He prayed “to be informed of a certainty of the 
meaning thereof.”244  In apparent answer to these prayers, he 
discovered “drops of blood on the corn” and “found on the leaves 
in the woods hieroglyphic characters and numbers, with the 
forms of men in different attitudes, portrayed in blood, and 
representing the figures I had seen before in the heavens.”245  
From this, he concluded, “the great day of judgment was at 
hand.”246  This conclusion was further confirmed by a miraculous 
healing he performed on a white man, and by a solar eclipse.247  
Convinced he was called to “fight against the Serpent” and help 
Christ ensure that “the first should be last and the last should 
be first,” he began to plan how he would “slay [his] enemies with 
their own weapons.”248  He planned with six of his closest friends 
to start this divine violence at his own master’s house and “until 
[they] had armed and equipped [them]selves, and gathered 
sufficient force, neither age nor sex was to be spared.”249  The 
 
religious imagery and language is likely to be Turner’s, given the very prosaic 
voice of Gray’s introduction). 
240.  Id. at 43 (repeating this phrase twice in the narrative, and again, 
would seem to be in Turner’s voice, rather than Gray’s). 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Id. at 44. 
244.  CONFESSIONS, supra note 238. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at 45. 
247.  Id. at 45–46. 
248.  CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 46. 
249.  Id. 
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band visited the wrath of God on eleven farms that night, 
including a household of ten white school children, who were all 
cut down or shot.250  They spared neither women who asked for 
quarter, nor infants.251 
Like Joan of Arc, Turner did not show signs of insanity in 
the rest of his life, but was extremely bright and a trusted and 
hard worker.252  Even in Turner’s prison cell, Thomas Gray 
seems surprised to encounter Turner’s “intelligence” and “calm, 
deliberate composure:” 
 
It has been said he was ignorant and cowardly, 
and that his object was to murder and rob for the 
purpose of obtaining money to make his escape. It 
is notorious, that he was never known to have a 
dollar in his life; to swear an oath, or drink a drop 
of spirits. As to his ignorance, he certainly never 
had the advantages of an education, but he can 
read and write, (it was taught him by his parents,) 
and for natural intelligence and quickness of 
apprehension, is surpassed by few men I have 
ever seen. As to his being a coward, his reason as 
given for not resisting Mr. Phipps, shews [sic] the 
decision of his character . . . . He is a complete 
fanatic, or plays his part most admirably. On 
other subjects he possesses an uncommon share of 
intelligence, with a mind capable of attaining any 
thing; but warped and perverted by the influence 
of early impressions.253 
 
Like Joan, Turner was unrepentant, convinced of his divine 
mission even in defeat.254 Like Joan’s, Turner’s prophetic visions 
of “white spirits and black spirits engaged in battle” were 
 
250.  Id. at 49. 
251.  Id. at 46 (“it was quickly agreed we should commence at home . . . 
and until we had armed and equipped ourselves, and gathered sufficient force, 
neither age nor sex was to be spared, (which was invariably adhered to)”). 
252.  Id. at 1, 9, 46, 52–53. 
253.  Id. at 52. 
254.  Id. 
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fulfilled a few decades after his death, with the Civil War.255  
Like the Catholic Church, the South reacted by cracking down 
on heresy: African American enslaved people were no longer to 
learn to read (even the Scriptures) nor preach, nor form 
congregations, but could attend church only with their white 
masters, and those considered potential revolutionaries were 
killed in the cruelest of ways.256 
 
D. It’s All God Anyway (Law is Irrelevant) 
 
“You say that I am guilty. Impious and rash! 
Thus to usurp the prerogatives of your Maker! 
To set up your bounded views and halted reason, 
as the measure of truth!”257 
 
From one extreme of this taxonomy, at which law cannot 
take revelation seriously, we arrive at the other extreme, where 
revelation gives no weight to law, be it secular or religious.  From 
the standpoint of revelation alone, laws are foolish, religious 
doctrines of discernment irrelevant, for even the devil is merely 
an instrument of the divine.258 
There is an extreme arrogance in such self-authenticating, 
individual claims of revelation that seems to run through 
American culture, undercutting all forms of law. Inspired, or 
fascinated, by several egregious cases of murder-by-divine-
decree in 1780s America, in which devout men, after quiet 
contemplation with their Bibles, slaughtered their families to 
purify their souls,259 Charles Brockden Brown wrote the first 
 
255.  Id. at 44. 
256.  CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 20 (Greenburg introduction). 
257.  CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, WIELAND: OR, THE TRANSFORMATION, AN 
AMERICAN TALE 205 (Invisible College Press 2001) (1857). 
258.  Compare Calvinist reaction, with Frantick Hacket, supra note 45. 
259.  William Beadle & James Yates, An Account of a Murder Committed 
by Mr. J—Y-—upon his Family, in December. A.D. 1781., N.Y. WKLY. MAG., 
July 27, 1796, at 20, 28.  Other cases are recounted in Marsh, The Great Sin of 
Striving with God (1783) and Stephen Mix Mitchell, A Narrative of the Life of 
William Beadle (1783). Stan Krauss found earlier cases in which suspected 
witches were killed: Thomas Goss (1785) murdered his family because he 
thought his wife was a witch and God would protect him. Goss refused a 
legislative pardon.  In 1799, in New York, John Pastano received a legislative 
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American novel in 1793.260  Wieland: or, The Transformation, An 
American Tale, explores the implications of deific decree murder 
at precisely this point where all forms of discernment fail and 
revelation is completely self-authenticating.261 
Clara, who narrates the novel in a somewhat unreliable 
epistolary fashion, lives a perfect Jane Austen life of 
conversation and education with her brother Wieland, sister-in-
law Catherine, and Wieland’s rationalist friend Pleyel (for whom 
Clara secretly carries a torch).262  This idyll is interrupted when 
the mysterious Carwin shows up at their door—an 
extraordinarily fascinating and highly intellectual vagrant.263  
Soon afterwards, the intellectual quartet begins hearing 
voices.264  Clara is haunted by voices of burglars in the closet.265  
Wieland hears his wife Catherine’s voice under circumstances 
that make that impossible.266  Pleyel believes he overhears Clara 
seducing Carwin.267  Off-stage, Wieland comes to believe from 
his experience of these impossible voices that he can at last 
speak directly to God.268  To prove his singular devotion to God, 
God demands that Wieland sacrifice his wife and children.269  
Later in the novel, Wieland kills them, believing that God has 
commanded this, and that his act is innocent.270 
Carwin turns out to be a ventriloquist who has caused much 
of the group’s confusion and anxiety, including the break-up of 
the romance of Clara and Pleyel.271 Carwin does not, however, 
acknowledge responsibility for Wieland’s God-voices that decree 
his murders. 
 
pardon after killing his family. See also ROBINSON, supra note 24.  Midelfort 
recounts a similar notorious case in Wurttemberg, in 1590, in which a master 
dyer “murdered his wife and attacked his four children in their beds,” after 
accusing his wife of witchcraft.  MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 183. 
260.  BROWN, supra note 257. 
261.  Id. 
262.  Id. 
263.  Id. 
264.  Id. 
265.  Id. 
266.  BROWN, supra note 257. 
267.  Id. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. 
270.  Id. 
271.  Id. 
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All along, the actions of the humans seem trivially wrong at 
worst, yet result in horrific consequences they are unable to 
imagine or forfend.  As John Matteson’s introduction points out, 
the power of human understanding and effective action is 
undermined throughout.  Coincidence and fate seem to magnify 
the consequences of Carwin’s random acts of ventriloquism, 
which are motivated merely by caprice, jealousy, and 
expedience, threading them along like beads into a sinister 
plotline that seems the product of demonic malice, not mischief. 
The provenance of Wieland’s “voice of God” is never 
completely settled, leaving it undecided whether it was Carwin 
(who perhaps continues to deceive Clara and others), a fraud by 
Clara as an untrustworthy narrator, God, a demon, or a form of 
insanity.272  The book also fails to settle whether Wieland 
himself can be held responsible for his homicides.  Clara ends 
the novel with an anodyne conclusion that: “If Wieland had 
framed juster notions of moral duty, and of the divine attributes; 
or if I had been gifted with ordinary equanimity or foresight, the 
double-tongued deceiver would have been baffled and 
repelled.”273  Yet, given Wieland’s character as the admirer of 
Cicero, as the grave and “indefatigable student”274 of the history 
of religious opinions who deemed it “indispensable to examine 
the ground of his belief, to settle the relation between motives 
and actions, the criterion of merit, and the kinds and properties 
of evidence”275 with a mind “enriched by science,”276 in which 
“moral necessity, and Calvinistic inspiration, were the props on 
 
272.  Wieland’s uncle, Thomas Cambridge says: “Carwin, perhaps, or 
heaven, or insanity, prompted the murderer; but Carwin is unknown.” BROWN, 
supra note 257, at 188.  The framing story of Clara and Wieland’s father, who 
died in a mysterious white flame after being convinced that he had forfeited 
heavenly favor by refusing a divine commandment, both keeps open the 
possibility of an inherited madness, and of a genuine divine or demonic 
visitation:  “Was this the penalty of disobedience? This the stroke of a 
vindictive and invisible hand? Is it a fresh proof that the divine Ruler interferes 
in human affairs, meditates an end, selects, and commissions his agents, and 
enforces by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his will? Or, was it merely 
the irregular expansion of the fluid that imparts warmth to our heart and our 
blood, caused by the fatigue of the preceding day, or flowing, by established 
laws, from the condition of his thoughts?” Id. at 27. 
273.  Id. at 282. 
274.  Id. at 32. 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. 
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which my brother thought proper to repose,”277 Clara’s 
indictment rings hollow.  The book makes it difficult to believe 
that the murders occurred because Wieland had not adequately 
studied “moral duty” or the “divine attributes.”278 
Another possibility is that the group’s very isolation and 
insularity creates the tragedy.  Wieland is very much like his 
own religion-obsessed father, who: 
 
[A]llied himself with no sect, because he perfectly 
agreed with none.  Social worship is that by which 
they are all distinguished; but this article found 
no place in his creed.  He rigidly interpreted that 
precept which enjoins us, when we worship, to 
retire into solitude, and shut out every species of 
society. According to him devotion was not only a 
silent office, but must be performed alone . . . .  
His system was embraced not, accurately 
speaking, because it was the best, but because it 
had been expressly prescribed to him.279 
 
Clara tells us that Wieland’s studies likewise were solitary, 
and no community of believers or church institution, other than 
that provided by the small family group, filtered or discussed his 
conclusions.280  Indeed, he never speaks of his conviction that 
God is communicating directly to him until after he has acted on 
His command. 
Wieland’s confession reads like a passage of scripture, or a 
Jonathan Edwards sermon, using the archaic second person 
“thous” and “thines” rather than the more informal language he 
uses in the rest of the novel.  The intense first-person focus, 
moreover, confirms a kind of inspired insular solipsism.281 
 
 
277.  Id. at 34. 
278.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 282. 
279.  Id. at 18. 
280.  Id. 
281.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 161 (“It is needless to say that God is the 
object of my supreme passion . . . . A voice spake like that which I had before 
heard—’Thou hast done well; but all is not done—the sacrifice is incomplete—
thy children must be offered— they must perish with their mother!’”). 
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If my judges are unable to discern the purity of my 
intentions, or to credit the statement of them, 
which I have just made; if they see not that my 
deed was enjoined by heaven; that obedience was 
the test of perfect virtue, and the extinction of 
selfishness and error, they must pronounce me a 
murderer. 
They refuse to credit my tale; they impute my 
acts to the influence of daemons; they account me 
an example of the highest wickedness of which 
human nature is capable; they doom me to death 
and infamy. Have I power to escape this evil? If I 
have, be sure I will exert it. I will not accept evil 
at their hand, when I am entitled to good; I will 
suffer only when I cannot elude suffering. 
You say that I am guilty. Impious and rash! 
Thus to usurp the prerogatives of your Maker! To 
set up your bounded views and halted reason, as 
the measure of truth! 
Thou, Omnipotent and Holy! Thou knowest 
that my actions were conformable to thy will. I 
know not what is crime; what actions are evil in 
their ultimate and comprehensive tendency or 
what are good. Thy knowledge, as they power, is 
unlimited. I have taken thee for my guide, and 
cannot err. To the arms of thy protection, I entrust 
my safety. In the awards of thy justice, I confide 
for my recompense. 
Come death when it will, I am safe. Let 
calumny and abhorrence pursue me among men; 
I shall not be defrauded of my dues. The peace of 
virtue, and the glory of obedience, will be my 
portion hereafter.282 
 
282.  Id. at 204–05. Wieland’s confession is very similar in substance, 
style and tone to that of John Yates, at least as recounted by a reporter for the 
New York Weekly Magazine in 1796.  See Beadle & Yates, supra note 259.  The 
Yates news account also seems eerily similar to the facts of a familicide that 
occurred in 1755, so it may be itself somewhat fictionalized. See NEIL 
WEBSDALE, FAMILICIDAL HEARTS: THE EMOTIONAL STYLES OF 211 KILLERS (2010) 
(recounting the 1755 family murder by John Myrack in Pennsylvania in which 
the mode of killing was very similar (hitting two childrens’ skulls against a 
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Clara and her uncle later debate the sincerity and sanity of 
Weiland’s confession.  Her uncle believes Weiland is insane, but 
Clara demurs: “none but a command from heaven could have 
swayed his will; and nothing but unerring proof of divine 
approbation could sustain his mind in its present elevation.”283 
Wieland later breaks loose from confinement and confronts 
Clara directly, confusing her more still, and even threatening to 
kill her: 
 
Once it was the scope of my labours to destroy 
thee, but I was prompted to the deed by heaven; 
such, at least, was my belief.  Thinkest thou that 
thy death was sought to gratify malevolence?  No. 
I am pure from all stain. I believed that my God 
was my mover! 
Neither thee nor myself have I cause to 
injure.  I have done my duty, and surely there is 
merit in having sacrificed to that, all that is dear 
to the heart of man.  If a devil has deceived me, he 
came in the habit of an angel.  If I erred, it was 
not my judgment that deceived me, but my senses.  
In thy sight, being of being!  I am still pure.  Still 
will I look for my reward in thy justice!284 
 
Clara remains uncertain: 
 
Perhaps this was merely a transition of his 
former madness into a new shape. Perhaps he had 
 
rock, killing a nursing infant, and burning his wife’s face so as to be 
unrecognizable)).  Websdale also discusses murders by James Purrington, in 
1780 in Maine, who killed his family with an axe and a razor, and that of John 
Beadle, in Connecticut in 1782, which was preceded by a “last supper” of 
oysters for his “flock,” after which he chloroformed his family members and 
methodically cut their throats.  Websdale also recounts Yates’ murder, but 
relies on the same source as above. The Beadle, Yates, and Purrington murders 
were all committed by fathers who were allegedly loving and upright, all were 
connected with religious commands or beliefs, and Websdale suggests that 
they were all committed by “deists” who were outside of established churches. 
Nothing is known about the motivation for the Myrack murders.  Beadle 
apparently believed in predestination.  Id. 
283.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 210. 
284.  Id. at 260. 
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not yet awakened to the memory of the horrors 
which he had perpetrated.  Infatuated wretch that 
I was!  To set myself up as a model by which to 
judge of my heroic brother!  My reason taught me 
that his conclusions were right; but conscious of 
the impotence of reason over my own conduct; 
conscious of my cowardly rashness and my 
criminal despair, I doubted whether any one could 
be stedfast and wise.285 
 
Then, Wieland twists the narrative again: “‘Clara,’ he 
continued, advancing closer to me. ‘thy death must come.  This 
minister is evil, but he from whom his commission was received 
is God. Submit then with all thy wonted resignation to a decree 
that cannot be reversed or resisted.”286 
Here is the turning point that Brown makes clear to us: for 
Wieland, it no longer matters whether the voice he hears is divine 
or demonic—for even evil is controlled by God. Wieland is still, 
ultimately, a divine agent, because God is all.  Law, good and 
evil, have all disappeared.287  Wieland’s Calvinist predestination 
(mentioned earlier) takes its final turn.  If all individual action 
is directed by a grander, unknown narrative, then there is no 
responsibility, and no place for adjudication or for human law.  
There is only resignation to an inevitable destiny that allows 
murder or nurture, seemingly at random. 
Just as Wieland is about to strangle Clara, he is rebuked 
aloud by another mysterious voice and told that he is insane.288  
Brown is intentionally obscure about whether this voice is 
Carwin’s ventriloquism, whether Clara imagines the voice, or 
 
285.  Id. 
286.  Id. at 261. 
287.  Id. For an eerie recent parallel, see Lyndsay Winkley, Woman 
Waving Handgun, Carrying Baby, Threatens to Blow Up Church During Easter 
Service, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.officer.com/co 
mmand-hq/technology/security-surveillance/news/21077241/woman-waving-
gun-carrying-baby-threatens-to-blow-up-church-during-easter-service (“Conk-
ey posted her last video hours before . . . . In it, she claims that Jesus and Satan 
are one and that she was sent to reveal the truth to the masses. ‘If God decides 
to blow your minds by appearing as someone very unexpected and doing very 
unexpected things and saying crazy, crazy stuff, maybe you should listen,’ she 
said”). 
288.  Id. 
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whether God himself speaks (“a voice, louder than human 
organs could produce”289 ),but the voice stops Wieland from 
killing Clara.290  Believing that he is insane and not guided by 
God is the one outcome Wieland cannot bear; the one outcome 
that denies him status as a divine agent.291  Wieland, in his 
despair at the senselessness of his actions, stabs himself.292 
By this point, Clara has lost any sense of the point of having 
discernment and does not care where the voice came from: “Be it 
so: I care not from what source these disasters have flowed; it 
suffices that they have swallowed up our hopes and our 
existence.  What his agency began, his agency conducted to a 
close . . . .  Such is his tale, concerning the truth of which I care 
not.”293  Note that her language changes here to the same kind 
of biblical sing-song used by Wieland in his confession, and one 
wonders, not for the first time, about Clara’s own sanity.  With 
the loss of a reliable narrator, the reader now has no firm grasp 
on reality and is flung, along with the characters, into a 
fractured surreal. 
Wieland was written after the American religious Great 
Awakening had solidified the position of new evangelical faiths, 
all of which placed a great deal of emphasis on personal 
conversion narratives and religious experiences.294  In the novel, 
Wieland explicitly mentions the Moravians and their leader 
Zinzendorf as objects of his study.295  The Moravians were a 
“close-knit communitarian body . . . pacifistic, intensely 
devout.”296 Clara’s narration also connects Wieland’s 
contemplations with doctrines of Calvinism, which in this period 
was intensely focused on the doctrine of predestination and 
election.  In short, Moravians were quietists; Calvinists were 
 
289.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 265. 
290.  Id. 
291.  Cf. SHAW, supra note 231, at act VI (Saint Joan recantation scene). 
292.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 265. 
293.  Id. at 216. 
294.  GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 108 (2002); see also SHAI LAVI, 
THE MODERN ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2005). 
295.  BROWN, supra note 257, at 19. 
296.  GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5; see also David Zimmerman, 
Charles Brockden Brown and the Conundrum of Complicity, 88 AM. 
LITERATURE 665 (2016). 
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fatalists.  Neither sect had much truck with human agency or 
law. 
Wieland’s author, Charles Brockden Brown, was himself a 
son of Quakers, a small sect of pacifists who valued individual 
spiritual experience, but denied Calvinist doctrines of 
predestination and original sin.297  It is hard not to read the 
novel as an indictment of Calvinism’s doctrines of predestination 
and divine vengeance, which seem to goad Wieland to murder.  
Perhaps the foreign-born Carwin, whose disembodied voices sow 
such confusion, is a figure of Catholicism, another target of 
Quaker dissenters; and yet, such a reading over-simplifies.  Fate 
plays a devious role in the story, rolling coincidence into tragedy, 
emphasizing, rather than disproving, the Calvinist doctrine that 
humans, no matter how good or innocent, are powerless to 
change their destiny.  It is also hard not to read the novel as a 
lesson about the fragility of individual intuition, the uncertainty 
of experiencing divine communication, and the dangerous 
insularity of the small congregation—all of which must have 
been key features of Brown’s own Quaker home-life.  Brown may 
also have had in mind the witch trials of the century before, so 
evocative of the difficulty in determining whether inspiration is 
divine, demonic, or invented—a problem that was still a danger 
in the Yates and Beadle murders in his own day, and, as the 
cases above bear out, in our own. 
One might also be tempted to read the novel as advocating 
an age of reason, in a narrative argument against revelation.  
For contemporaries Jefferson and Adams, and many others in 
the founding age, the emphasis was on moral actions and virtue, 
not on religious experience or theological doctrines.  They 
believed that science, nature, reason, and God were all aligned 
(as did Kant), and, like Brown’s own Quaker family, rejected 
Calvinism’s idea of the elect and the God-fated evil-doer.298  
Thomas Paine took this empiricism even farther, rejecting all 
creed and clergy, prefiguring the secular individualism later 
apparent in Emerson’s Transcendentalism:  “My own mind is my 
own church.”299 
 
297.  GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 132–38. 
298. Id. 
299. Thomas Paine,  Age of Reason, pt. 1,  § 1,  THOMAS PAINE,  
http://www.ushistory.org/paine/reason/reason1.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 
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However, Brown’s novel seems an indictment of a cult of 
reason as well: Pleyel’s strictly scientific disposition does not 
prevent him from being led astray by voices, nor allow him to 
predict and prevent the murders, and the richly symbolic bust of 
Cicero, around which the little intellectual community gathered, 
lies smashed by the novel’s end.  Throughout, the novel points to 
the difficulty that any of us have discerning truth, condemned 
as we are always to the first-person viewpoint.  Despite 
Enlightenment emphasis on universal truths, strong American 
individualism invites an intuitionism that emphasizes miracle 
and individual experience over science and history.  Wieland 
rides this solipsistic reality divide in a kind of post-modernism 
that has recommended the novel to contemporary critics.300  
However, even post-modernism is indicted here.  Wieland’s 
violent destruction of idols is uncomfortably close to Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of myth- and law-destroying “divine 
violence,” which purges false human versions (idols) of law, 
justice, and sovereignty in order to eliminate the injustice they 
perpetuate by virtue of their apparent-but-false justice.301  
Wieland, then, is also a figure of the dark side of revelation as 
revolution. 
The cacophony of religious voices that Brown explores does 
not end with him.  The next generation and the Second Great 
Awakening coincided with a time when the protestant 
denominations divided over slavery, with the southern schisms 
declaring slavery to be Bible-based and deriding their northern 
counterparts as political and influenced by foreign interpretive 
doctrines rather than the Biblical text.302  As religion historians 
Gaustad and Schmidt put it, “[l]ike a rag doll, the Bible was 
tossed back and forth, now quoted to support slavery, now to 
 
2019). 
300. See, e.g., Christine Hedlin, “Was there not Reason to Doubt?”: 
Wieland and its Secular Age, 48 J. AM. STUDS. 735 (2014). 
301. See JAMES R. MARTEL, DIVINE VIOLENCE: WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE 
ESCHATOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 51–52 (2011). 
302. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 189–96. Methodists split in 
1844, Abolition and the Splintering of the Church, PBS: THIS FAR BY FAITH, 
https://www.pbs.org/thisfarbyfaith/journey_2/p_5.html, Baptists in 1845, 
Baptist Church, OHIO HISTORY CENT., http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Ba 
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attack it.”303 
In Caleb Smith’s analysis of the rhetorics of rule of law and 
religious resistance in the context of American slavery, he draws 
attention to a related intra-evangelical controversy: There was 
concern in nineteenth-century protestant abolitionist churches 
that fiery, judgmental religious rhetoric may have inspired deific 
decree murderers and ignited other violent acts.304  Some 
establishment ministers in the first half of the 1800s, like 
Lyman Beecher, argued for a calmer and more reasoned 
approach to preaching.305  According to Smith, these moderate 
preachers advocated a more law-based form of discernment that 
emphasized: (1) historical models (church doctrine, common law, 
Biblical interpretation, and church authority); (2) emotional 
intensity but not enthusiasm or evil speaking; (3) whether acts 
of love or violence are encouraged; (4) whether good works are 
emphasized rather than just feeling good; and (5) humility about 
one’s interpretive conclusions from divine inspiration.306  While 
Smith is concerned about the church establishment’s silencing 
of passionate abolitionist preaching, and its efforts to rechannel 
religious calls for the violent overthrow of slavery into 
 
303. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 191. 
304.  SMITH, supra note 23, at 129. 
305.  See generally Letter from Dr. Beecher to Mr. Beman (Dec. 15, 1827), 
in LETTERS OF THE REV. DR. BREECHER AND REV. MR. NETTLETON, ON THE “NEW 
MEASURES” IN CONDUCTING REVIVALS OF RELIGION 80 (1828); CATHERINE 
BREKUS, STRANGERS AND PILGRIMS: FEMALE PREACHING IN AMERICA 1740-1845 
(1998) (makes the case for Smith’s take, above); CHARLES CHAUNCEY ET AL., 
ENTHUSIASM DESCRIBED AND CAUTIONED AGAINST (1742); BENJAMIN DOOLITTLE, 
AN ENQUIRY INTO ENTHUSIASM (1743); Elijah Hedding, Self Government, in 
SERMONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS 13 (2d ed., 1859); SMITH, supra note 23, 
at 240–41 (referencing to Chamberlayne’s pamphlet); Elijah Hedding, The 
Substance of an Address Delivered to the Oneida Annual  Conference of 
Ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church (August 31 1838).  For more 
references about the intra-evangelical debate over the Great Awakenings I and 
II see ANN TAVES FITS, TRANCES, AND VISIONS: EXPERIENCING RELIGION AND 
EXPLAINING EXPERIENCE FROM WESLEY TO JAMES (1999).  Smith’s take on this 
literature is that “[t]he creation of true religion, and of its distinctive styles of 
public address, involved two related but different kinds of suppression: At one 
level, the silencing of the unlettered, the undisciplined, and the lowly; at 
another level, the authorizing self-regulation of those who spoke the truth.”  
SMITH, supra note 23, at 132. 
306.  SMITH, supra note 23, at 129 (cautioning that “Christian imperatives 
of humility and piety were used to stigmatize the feverish public performances 
of women who lacked the formal education of ministers”). 
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incremental compromises and non-violent demonstrations,307 
the themes of Beecher’s concern replay and rehearse the crack-
down on evangelical practices also apparent in the Catholic 
tradition, above.  The recursion to established traditions and 
hierarchies protected against a “divine violence” that may 
command both fanatical murders and radical, revolutionary 
calls for justice. 
Both the brutal and the revolutionary forms of revelation 
are peculiarly American.  As historians of religion point out, the 
United States has always been a protestant nation in the sense 
of being prone to schism and generally committed to rebellion 
against established religious institutions and professional 
religious mediators—always seeking direct, personal, and 
individual religious experiences in a kind of smorgasbord of 
religious democracy focused on the individual’s sovereign choice 
to accept a particular brand of faith.308  As one popular book 
promises, in just twenty-one days, you too can be a prophet.309  
Amanda Porterfield argues that American law’s combination of 
religious protectionism and deregulation pursuant to the First 
Amendment promoted just such consumer-driven, “personalized 
forms of spirituality.”310  Wieland is indeed an American tale of 
individual revelation—against social convention, against 
established churches, and against the law.  The Defendant who 
kills pursuant to a special mission from God may be a peculiarly 
American trope: The world that fails to see my personal divine 
vision is suffering from delusion, not me.  I alone can see all the 





307.  Id. at 182–84 (insinuating that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s brother’s 
failure to support John Brown’s violent tactics was pusillanimous because he 
limited his abolitionist goals to promoting civil disobedience in the North and 
lobbying southern legislators to protect slave-family relations).   
308. See Demko, supra note 12 (emphasizing the choice to follow a 
particular religion should be considered rational, not insane, and pointing to 
the importance of a particular person’s acceptance, e.g., of Christ as your 
personal savior); see also Porterfield, supra note 232. 
309. See JAMES W. GOLL, THE LIFESTYLE OF A WATCHMAN: A 21-DAY 
JOURNEY TO BECOMING A GUARDIAN IN PRAYER (2017). 
310. Porterfield, supra note 232. 
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E. Reason is Finite, God is Infinite, Humans are Ignorant 
 
Where does this fractured, solipsistic reality leave us?  
Soren Kierkegaard,311 in Fear and Trembling, tries to grasp the 
self-authenticating revelation in the context of God’s command 
to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.  As in the taxonomy offered 
earlier, Kierkegaard contrasts the Kantian God of Reason and a 
God who commands the unreasonable.  The first, while infinitely 
demanding, is much easier for humans to conceive.  The human 
who follows a God of reason, which Kierkegaard calls a “knight 
of the infinite,” is willing to do his duty and to uphold a universal 
law.312  The knight of the infinite may suffer for his adherence to 
principle, but all reasonable beings must honor him for it.  The 
knight of the infinite has a duty to deliberate with other 
reasonable beings, to consider the evidence, to follow precedent 
and principles of discernment, but once convinced by rational 
argument, the knight of the infinite needs only to follow reason, 
whatever the sacrifice.  These sacrifices are tragic, but they are 
undeniably for the right. 
However, Kierkegaard points out that religion requires a 
knight of faith, not a knight of the infinite.313  Abraham is 
commanded by God to sacrifice his beloved son Isaac.314  There 
is no reason given for this commandment.  It is not demanded by 
a universal ethical principle, but is forbidden by ethics, for ethics 
considers it an unjustified murder of the most heinous sort, as 
well as the breach of a prior contract between Abraham and 
God.315  Abraham does not doubt or complain of this command—
he consults no one, he deliberates with no one, he consults no 
principles of discernment, he knows no rational debate is of use.  
God has commanded it, and it must be done.  Abraham’s love for 
God and absolute obedience to him must come before the law, 
 
311. This account of Kierkegaard is drawn from a discussion in my prior 
article: Linda R. Meyer, I Would Kill for You: Law and Sacrifice in ‘To Kill a 
Mockingbird,’ in REIMAGINING TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Umphrey & Sarat, eds., 
2011). 
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reason, sanity, and comprehension. 
Like Wieland, Abraham has no guarantee that the request 
is divine rather than demonic; he must recognize the command 
of itself.  He must do without Kant, who asserts that we only 
recognize God because he is good.  However, what if Abraham is 
mistaken?  He has nothing but his own faith to reassure him 
that it is God and not some demon that instructs him.  If he is 
mistaken: 
 
[W]hat can save him?  He suffers all the pain of 
the tragic hero, he brings to naught his joy in the 
world, he renounces everything . . . and perhaps 
at the same instant debars himself from the 
sublime joy which to him was so precious that he 
would purchase it at any price.  Him the beholder 
cannot understand nor let his eye rest confidently 
upon him.316 
 
Yet, the marvel for Kierkegaard is not that Abraham 
proceeds to follow the command, but that he believes firmly that 
in doing so, all will be well—not in some other life, but in this 
life.317  This faith in miracle, in the impossible and the absurd, 
is what Kierkegaard admires in Abraham, but cannot achieve 
himself.318 
 
At the moment when the knight made the act of 
resignation, he was convinced, humanly speaking, 
of the impossibility.  This was the result reached 
by the understanding, and he had sufficient 
energy to think it . . . . This is quite as clear to the 
knight of faith, so the only thing that can save him 
is the absurd, and this he grasps by faith.  So he 
recognizes the impossibility, and that very instant 
he believes the absurd.319 
 
316.  SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE BOOK ON ADLER 
51 (Walter Lowrie, trans., Knopf 1994). 
317.  Id. 
318.  Id. 
319.  KIERKEGAARD, supra note 316, at 31. 
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Kierkegaard thus recognizes the absurdity that seems so 
much a part of revelation’s rebellion against reason, but he stops 
short of accusing Abraham of insanity.  Here, Kiekegaard is 
defeated; he can only acknowledge human finitude and the 




The exploration of the deific decree puzzle has taken us to 
the heights of sainthood and the depths of American 
individualism’s pathologies of exceptionalism.  It has been a wild 
ride.  The Article concludes below with four comparatively 
modest suggestions about handling cases of deific decree.  First, 
law, and perhaps religion, should exercise a jurisdictional 
humility in making judgments about revelation.  Second, secular 
law can learn from religious practices of discernment to look 
more broadly at the life and practices of a defendant asserting a 
deific decree experience. Third, the distinction between direct 
divine command and religious or secular law that is present in 
the deific decree cases is an important one, emphasizing that 
most disputes we characterize as disputes between religion and 
law are intra-legal, not true disputes between law and 
revelation.  Fourth, law should not recognize a deific decree 
defense beyond M’Naghten, not because it would establish a 
church (for deific decree murders purport to establish no law, 





The deific decree cases do not have the happy ending of the 
Abraham and Isaac story.  God does not stop these murders at 
the last minute, and even though many of these defendants 
testify to feeling a kind of contentment or consolation after their 
crimes rather than suffering guilt (as does Wieland), we strongly 
suspect that feeling is false.  We may be wrong about that 
assessment, and it may be that their confidence in the divinity 
of their actions turns out to be justified in some other world.  
However, the probabilities seem slim, even assuming the 
premises of a religious afterlife, if God turns out not to be a moral 
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monster, or if, as Aquinas would have it, we believe that reason 
gives us at least some insight into the divine as well as into the 
temporal.  Perhaps that is why Isaac Watts, in his treatise on 
logic for religious children, concludes that divine revelation 
“belongs only to a few Favourites of Heaven . . . and not to the 
Bulk of Mankind.”320  For the Bulk of us, perhaps, humility and 
adherence to reason are the safer course. 
The first conclusion this Article draws is that humans have 
both a religious and legal duty of humility—to presume that we 
are not the chosen one and that we should not be quick to treat 
ourselves as an exception to the human rule of right and wrong.  
There are many reasons for a rule of reluctance to believe in 
one’s cosmic importance—we know that we are prone to 
grandiosity, and such over-estimation of our own exceptionalism 
is all-too-unexceptional.321  We are all quick to believe that we 
are special and even magical,322 and one of the attractions of 
religion is that it gives us that reassurance.  Underneath all, 
perhaps, is the so very human longing for eros, the desire to be 
loved deeply and passionately as a unique and irreplaceable 
person, and a longing for a personal destiny that gives life 
meaning.  Nevertheless, while we know eros can lead to some of 
the worst crimes in pursuit of the beloved (as Weiland’s 
passionate desire to win divine favor evinces), eros is in itself no 
excuse.  Humility counsels caution in believing that we are God’s 
chosen instrument. 
I was moved by the response of the reporter who, in 1796, 
recounted the confession of John Yates.  In December 1781, 
Yates spent a quiet night with friends and family, studying the 
Bible and singing hymns.323  He was affectionate to his wife and 
children, and talked about how he looked forward to returning 
his brother’s visit soon in his new sleigh.324  Only a few hours 
later, Yates recounted being visited by two spirits, and he was 
 
320. WATTS, supra note 105, at 182. 
321. See accounts of the Dunning-Kruger effect and “Jerusalem 
Syndrome.”  See also NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND 
TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2001) (explaining how agency bias causes us to 
overestimate our power to control events). 
322. I am still waiting for that letter from Hogwarts. 
323. Beadle & Yates, supra note 259. 
324. Id. 
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told to “destroy his idols.”325  He burned his Bible, took an axe to 
his brand-new sleigh and horses, and hunted down and killed 
his wife and children, even as they begged for mercy.326  He 
refused to repent ever afterwards, and though “he expressed 
much sorrow for the loss of his dear family,” he insisted that he 
had done the deeds “in obedience to thy commands” and “for thy 
glory.”327 The reporter, at a loss for explanation, concludes: 
 
But what avail our conjectures, perhaps it is best 
that some things are concealed from us, and the 
only use we can now make of our knowledge of his 
affair, is to be humble under a scene of human 
frailty to renew our petition, “Lead us not into 
temptation.”328 
 
A similar comment appears in the sentencing of Nat Turner.  
After the judge reminds him of his guilt for the deaths of 
“helpless women,” “infant children,” and of the “bosom 
associates” he misled to their destruction: “Borne down by this 
load of guilt, your only justification is, that you were led away by 
fanaticism. If this be true, from my soul I pity you; and while you 
have my sympathies, I am nevertheless called upon to pass the 
sentence of the court.”329 
So, let’s say we have a religious and legal duty to be humble 
about our exceptional character and an obligation to presume, 
not lightly defeasible, that we are part of “the Bulk of Mankind” 
subject to Kant’s kingdom of ends.  A defendant claiming to kill 
by deific decree, then, should have an impossibly high burden of 
proof. 
 
Taking Religious Law Seriously 
 
Law could also borrow some of the other lessons learned by 




327.  Beadle & Yates, supra note 259, at 20, 28. 
328.  Id. 
329.  CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 54–55. 
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of revelation versus insanity.  For example, Catholic practice 
looks to the general mental health and reliability of the 
purported visionary as an important test of the miraculous.  The 
history of mental illness and other delusions of the defendant 
should be relevant, and we should not pinpoint our 
determination of insanity so specifically to the final act of killing 
that this general background is not considered.  As in the case of 
Guiteau, whom Judge Cox instructed could not escape conviction 
if his mental state in general was clear and rational,330 Mr. 
Turgeon should be convicted, but Mr. Singleton and Mrs. Archie, 
who suffered long from many forms of delusions and 
dislocations, should be acquitted as insane.  While the deific 
decree should not be, on its own, evidence of insanity, the many 
other instances of delusion should and can inform the question 
of when the law may decide to treat a sincerely held religious 
belief as an instance of insanity. 
All faith traditions also emphasize the need to compare the 
vision or prophecy with good deeds and good works.  Even if God 
is not bound by human law or ethical practice, God is usually 
and probably, insofar as humans can know, aligned with ethical 
practice.  Even the evangelical traditions that most support 
contemporary personal divine revelation are likely to attribute 
a deific decree to murder to be the product of confusion, self-
delusion, narcissism, or insanity rather than a genuine 
revelation.  If one can speak of evidentiary burdens in a 
revelatory context, the burden of proof of divine authority for 
murder is so heavy that one’s personal conviction may never 
alone be sufficient, Abraham, Nat Turner, and Joan of Arc 
notwithstanding.  In G.B. Shaw’s tongue-in-cheek ending to his 
play Saint Joan, after her rehabilitation and sainthood, Jane 
suggests she may come back to life. Immediately, all her 
supporters find flimsy excuses to desert her. For while we may 
be perfectly happy to declare Joan a saint post mortem, we would 
not want to resurrect her to disrupt our politics, churches, legal 
 
330.  Guiteau v. United States, 10 F. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); see also 
MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 191 (noting that according to the 1472 treatise 
De Maleficiis, by Italian jurist Angelus Aretinus, when insanity was 
intermittent, “a previous condition of madness shifted the burden of proof to 
the accuser, who had to prove that the offense occurred during a lucid 
interval”). 
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institutions, and lives.331 
All faith traditions also impose some obligation of expert 
intersubjectivity—whether the check on revelation be another 
parishioner, a pastor, or an official papal committee of inquiry.  
The presumption of intersubjectivity is itself an ethical 
imperative based on a faith tradition that God cares for all 
people, not just one.  Therefore, the revelations God makes to 
you privately should not be substantially at variance with the 
revelations (S)he has already made through tradition, history, 
and divine texts available to all.  The irony is, of course, that the 
Bible is full of instances in which God picks out one person to 
communicate with in private.  Prophets are destabilizing, 
usually tasked with being the bearers of bad news that strikes 
at the heart of a religious tradition.  Perhaps it is the deepest 
irony that it is only with the greatest trepidation that any faith 
tradition acknowledges as divine a person’s private vision that 
changes the course of traditional religio-ethical practice or 
allows breach of an ethical rule.  While Turgeon did check his 
revelation with his co-defendant, the isolation and idiosyncratic 
nature of their church enhances the danger of solipsism and 
delusion, as in Wieland.  Even an ecclesiastical court, then, 
would likely condemn Turgeon’s act and deny it a divine origin. 
 
God v. Law 
 
The deific decree cases thus illuminate for us the difference 
between religious law and direct experience of the divine.  The 
deific decree cases always distinguish between defendants who 
assert that church law or moral doctrine requires them to kill, 
and defendants who assert a direct prophetic vision—a direct 
command from God to kill.  In the case of cultural or religious 
doctrinal conflict, at least in the context of murder, no deific 
decree defense has been recognized.  The courts have recognized 
implicitly that those who disagree with law’s reason are 
asserting a version of a cultural defense and must convince their 
fellow citizens that the law is wrong, not ask for exceptions from 
the courts.  The deific decree doctrine, if it exists, extends only 
to one acting under the direct, personal command of God to 
 
331.  SHAW, supra note 231. 
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commit a specific crime.  This distinction between religious law 
and deific command, though not well-explained in the cases, is 
consistent with Justice Scalia’s view of the free exercise clause 
in Employment Division v. Smith, for to exalt religious law over 
secular law in judgments would be to establish a religion, not to 
be humble before the possibility of the divine.332 
The corollary is that, as churches become institutions, they 
must, like courts, refer back to reason, consistency, text, and 
authority, sound doctrine, and good morals, and cannot tolerate 
new revelation without schism.  A church can never 
acknowledge a truth based on revelation alone, if that revelation 
contradicts the established church tradition—sound doctrines 
and good morals—on which the institution itself depends for its 
identity.  Hence, any argument by a church that its law has a 
divine warrant ignores the fact that, where prophets differ or are 
silent or are ambivalent, prophecy must itself be sifted through 
religious law in order to be recognized by the institution as 
legitimate.  The rules of recognition within religious law, 
therefore, always place authority somewhere other than in a 
new revelation itself.  For example, even though the Bible is 
commonly understood by Christian churches as revealed truth, 
it also serves as an authoritative, highly interpreted, text that 
becomes a rule for those churches to use in recognizing, or not, 
new revelations.  The new revelation cannot self-authenticate—
 
332.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that religious activities are 
not discriminated against by law, not that they are entitled to exemptions from 
“neutral generally applicable law.”).  Hence, I do not think Stephen Smith’s 
view, supra note 230, that free exercise belongs only to churches and not to 
individual conscience, is valid.  At least in the context of the criminal law, to 
substitute church law for secular law directly in a criminal case where the 
community is the plaintiff would entail an establishment of religious law in 
place of the People’s law.  To refuse to prosecute, or to pardon someone so 
convicted, on the other hand, is to recognize law’s limits, and could be a means 
of accommodating religious persons, among others.  To exempt an individual 
from a generally applicable law requiring some other action, like paying taxes 
or reporting (rather than forbidding a crime) might be understood as an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and therefore not amount to an 
establishment of religion. Demko, supra note 12, at 1970–77, would likely 
disagree that decrees and rules can be distinguished, and Judge Posner, in 
Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354–55 (7th Cir. 2010), would likely disagree 
that treating deific decrees differently than cultural defenses would not be an 
Establishment Clause violation. 
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a second coming could only be authenticated by the first.  
Understood in light of the deific decree doctrine’s distinction 
between doctrine and decree, disputes about abortion, gay 
marriage, and other divisive issues of our time are primarily 
inter-religious and intra-legal doctrinal disputes about which set 
of religious or moral laws should be taken up by secular law to 
govern our conduct, subject to all the usual practices of reason-
giving, precedent, evidence, tradition, and text-based 
argumentation (though the core texts differ).  The positions in 
these disputes are not arguments from a self-revealing, self-
authenticating revelation.  They are not disputes directly 
between the secular law and God; and if they were, law would 
not be capable of discerning the beyond-the-law in any event.  
The best law can do is, like Pontius Pilot, wash its hands and 
walk away.333 
 
Deific Decree in Secular Courts 
 
Looking at established religious traditions for guidance, 
then, cannot avoid the legal dilemmas created by deific decree 
tests: We cannot treat revelations as insanity, for that would be 
to prefer atheism to religion.  We cannot presume that revelation 
will accord with law, for this prefers certain natural law or 
traditional religious views over others.  We cannot use a 
religious test for determining the validity of a revelatory 
experience, for the same reason (though noting the helpfulness 
of religious law analogies would not, it seems to me, be 
forbidden).  We cannot presume that a deific decree would 
supersede law, unless we would anchor all law in a self-
authenticating divine will beyond reason.  Instead, we must say, 
as we usually do in the context of free exercise doctrine, that we 
cannot know whether divinity is or is not and, therefore, also 
cannot know whether revelation is or not—such questions are 
beyond the jurisdiction of law.  We should, therefore, acquit only 
when a person exhibits insanity in other contexts and over time. 
This conclusion would rule out judging insanity in deific 
decree cases by a more inclusive volitional test, as other writers 
 
333.  See MARTEL, supra note 301, at 51.  
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have suggested.334  A person who sincerely claims that God has 
commanded them to do an act should not be treated as insane 
under any standard by virtue of that command in itself.  A 
related argument that would not require treating deific decree 
experiences as ipso facto insane is to accord a duress-like excuse 
to those who commit crimes because they are sincerely terrified 
of eternal divine retribution, as long as we accorded similarly 
sincere fears of danger from secular threats equal treatment.335  
A duress defense in this context, however, would have the same 
evidentiary and causation problems that attend volitional 
insanity defenses, unless it is restricted to divine threats of 
serious bodily injury, like being thrown for eternity into a lake 
of fire.336  A third possibility, recently argued for by Stephen 
Garvey, is to exonerate deific decree cases along with other cases 
in which a defendant loses his sense of his own agency—as do 
persons suffering from alien hand syndrome—though I suspect 
the proof problems would rival those in volitional insanity 
defenses.337  Assuming, as is likely, that courts continue to 
adhere to the cognitive M’Naghten standard, however, our rule 
might be that knowledge of generally accepted principles of right 
and wrong, against a background of a rational, organized life, 
would be enough to discount claims of insanity and to convict the 
person who claims to be God’s avenging agent on earth.  Where 
there is no indication that someone suffers from general 
disorders of thought, by itself, a conviction that “God told me to 
kill” should not be a defense.338 
I would not limit M’Naghten to require only knowledge of 
the positive law as disproof of insanity, rather than the 
traditional test of knowledge of right and wrong.  Our very 
presumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse 
 
334.  See Belt, supra note 8. 
335.  See Morris & Haroun, supra note 12,  at 1048 (necessity and 
duress—can an otherworldly threat of hell count?); see, e.g., State v. Blair, 732 
A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999) (where the defendant killed family to avoid eternal lake 
of fire). 
336.  See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 17 (reinstating M’Naghten in federal courts); United 
States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
337.  See Garvey, supra note 12. 
338.  See Morris & Haroun, supra note 12, at 1047 (stating “[i]f the 
person’s belief at the time he or she acted is declared to be a religious belief 
and not a delusional belief, then an insanity defense should not succeed”). 
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acknowledges that we know law through ethics, not through 
statute books.  Moreover, if we invoke such extreme skepticism 
about moral objectivity, and treat ethics as just as much beyond 
legal jurisdiction as religious truth, we undermine legal reason 
itself and commit ourselves to another kind of command-based 
will to power that may or may not accord with right.  Positive 
law, if it does not have a significant link to the most commonly 
accepted principles of ethics, is nothing more than a gunman 
writ large, as H.L.A. Hart put it.339  A purely positivistic view of 
law would require, for example, acquittal of soldiers commanded 
to kill by their legally-constituted superiors, just as deific decree 
doctrine would exonerate those commanded to kill by their 
God.340  Positive law in its extreme form is just as self-
authenticating as deific decrees and just as resistant to 
correction by conventional, reason-based, or nomos-based ideas 
of right and wrong.  The only difference is that a willful God is 
replaced by a willful legislature.341  The deep irony with 
positions that look to positive-law formulations of M’Naghten in 
order to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s subjective 
understanding of right and wrong is that the same solipsistic 
idea of a deific decree that unseats both legal and religious 
institutions is also present in positive law as the self-
authenticating sovereign will that dissolves law into exception 
and authoritarianism.342 
Finally, law can admit this possibility: that if we define 
insanity solely under M’Naghten, we may perhaps one day 
crucify a true prophet.  Many believe it would not be the first 
time. But if we have the bad fortune to convict a prophet, then 
at least we do so out of humility, as in John’s portrayal of the 
reluctant Pontius Pilate, rather than out of derision.343 From the 
 
339.  H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 (1958). 
340.  This observation is compatible with most “mixed” theories of positive 
law (in which the rule of recognition often includes some ethical rules or 
materials, or in which the positive law is generally derived from ethical 
principles) as well as with most theories of natural or customary law. 
341.  See Nonet, supra note 169. 
342.  Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., U. 
Chi. Press 2005); MARTEL, supra note 301, at 24, 26–27. 
343.  The need for humility in judging crime is also a reason that I would 
rule out life-without-parole and the death penalty. See LINDA R. MEYER, 
SENTENCING IN TIME (2017); LINDA R. MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY (2010). 
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standpoint of a convicted true prophet, imprisonment or even 
execution would be immaterial, of course,344 and a martyrdom 
may convince even human reason, in time, that justice requires 
a radically new vision of right and wrong, or even a bloody civil 
war.  As John Brown put it: 
 
Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit 
my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, 
and mingle my blood further with the blood of my 
children and with the blood of millions in this 
slave country whose rights are disregarded by 
wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments, I submit; so 
let it be done!345 
 
Where lawfulness ends, mercy and discretion may still have 
a place.  Law does recognize its own limitations in providing for 
the pardon power, for jury nullification,346 for sentencing 
discretion, and for prosecutorial discretion.  These are the 
practices we often use when law-as-reason runs out, and they 
often mark moments of law’s origins, law’s humility, or law’s 
compassion, where we cannot know, do not know, or cannot 
judge.  These places of the silence of law347 are where divinity 
may, or may not, be lurking. 
 
 
344.  Demko, supra note 12 (stating “[t]he true believer will accept his fate 
as ordained by God”). 
345. John Brown’s Last Speech, HIST. WEAPON, https://historyisaweapon.c 
om/defcon1/johnbrown.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019). 
346. See, e.g., Pando v. Fernandez, 499 N.Y.S.2d 950 (App. Div. 1986) 
(reinstating a contract suit despite the trial court’s determination that the 
plaintiff’s promised “saintly intervention” in helping the defendant choose 
winning lottery numbers was a consideration impossible to prove. The 
Appellate Court held that the contract required only the plaintiff’s best efforts 
to contact the saint, and so the matter was for the jury to determine). 
347. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND 
POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW (2007); MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY (2010). 
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